Protect the traffic situation first
The master and officer of the watch need an immediate answer to four questions:
- Is any propulsion or steering response available? - What is the vessel's heading, speed over ground and rate of drift? - What traffic, shoal water or infrastructure will the ship approach? - Can the position be trusted if satellite navigation is degraded?
Post additional lookouts where exposure permits. Plot the ship's movement using more than one available means, which may include visual bearings, radar ranges, echo sounder trends and comparison between independent receivers. A displayed latitude and longitude is not assurance when interference is suspected.
The bridge should warn nearby traffic early through the appropriate navigational and distress channels. It should also notify the relevant vessel traffic service or coastal authority and UKMTO, while the company security officer and designated shoreside emergency team receive a factual update. If life, ship or the marine environment is in grave and imminent danger, the master should not dilute a distress message into routine commercial reporting.
The message should state what is known: position and its confidence, propulsion and steering status, heading, drift, damage, fire, injuries, cargo, assistance required and next update time. Attribution can wait.
Does propulsion loss make the ship not under command?
Not automatically. Under the Collision Regulations, “not under command” is a functional condition: an exceptional circumstance makes the vessel unable to manoeuvre as required and therefore unable to keep out of another vessel's way.
A short engine stop with effective steering, adequate sea room and a prompt, reliable restart may not produce the same status as total power and steering loss in a traffic lane. Conversely, a ship with one engine turning may still lack the control needed to comply with the rules. The master must assess actual capability, not choose a label for convenience.
When the vessel is not under command, Rule 27 governs the required lights and shapes. Rule 35 governs sound signals in restricted visibility. The bridge should make the correct signals, issue an appropriate safety, urgency or distress broadcast, and keep a proper lookout. Rule 10 on traffic separation schemes does not remove the overriding need to avoid immediate danger.
The commercial team should never instruct a master to avoid declaring the real navigational condition because it may alarm a terminal, charterer or market. Concealing loss of control increases collision exposure and weakens the evidential record.
Treat position loss as a separate casualty
The 29 October report coupled loss of propulsion with loss of navigation systems. That combination is more dangerous than either failure alone.
The bridge team should identify which systems failed and why. A common electrical casualty can remove radar, electronic chart, gyro inputs, communications and steering indications together. A hostile strike may also damage antenna cables or cabinets. Regional satellite-navigation interference can create a plausible but false position even where screens remain powered.
Record raw observations and disagreements between sensors. Mark times, courses, ranges and bearings. Preserve screenshots and equipment alarms where safe. Do not allow an unverified automatic identification system position to become the basis for a tow, traffic instruction or incident account.
If the ship can transmit, its warning should describe uncertainty. “Position derived from visual and radar fixes” is more useful than a precise coordinate copied from a doubtful receiver.
Anchoring is a risk decision, not the default
Letting go an anchor can arrest drift, but only if depth, seabed, cable, swing room and under-keel clearance make that action safe. The forecast load, vessel's headway and proximity of traffic also matter.
In a security incident, the forecastle may be exposed to further attack, blast, smoke or unexploded ordnance. Sending crew forward can create a greater life-safety risk than continued drift. Suspected mine danger or an unknown device near the hull changes the calculation again.
The master should compare:
1. the predicted drift without anchoring; 2. the collision or grounding risk during the time required to anchor; 3. the probability that the anchor will hold; 4. the exposure of the anchoring team; and 5. the feasibility of recovery if machinery remains unavailable.
A “safe anchorage” may not be safe during conflict. The May 2026 Strait guidance specifically warns operators to assess safe waiting and anchoring options in a congested and insecure environment. Coastal authorities may direct or approve a location, but the ship still needs an executable plan.
Prepare for towing without creating another casualty
Tankers of at least 20,000 deadweight tonnes are required under SOLAS to have emergency towing arrangements at both ends. The arrangement is valuable only if the crew can identify, rig and communicate its use under the actual damage and threat conditions.
Before deploying personnel, assess fire, toxic atmosphere, cargo release, structural damage, unexploded ordnance and hostile exposure. Establish communications between bridge, deck team and assisting vessel. Confirm the intended connection, safe working areas, snap-back hazards, towing speed and abort signal.
Send the assisting authority accurate information about freeboard, connection condition, power availability, steering, cargo and damage. A powerful tug cannot compensate for an unsafe connection or people standing in a recoil zone.
Owners should keep ship-specific emergency towing booklets accessible offline. A shore team can help obtain tugs and permissions, but it should not improvise deck instructions from a generic diagram.
A restarted engine does not prove voyage fitness
Pressure to clear the lane will be intense. Yet the first successful turn of the propeller is evidence of limited function, not evidence that the ship can safely complete the voyage.
Engineering checks should address the cause of shutdown and the systems that a strike may have degraded: fuel and lubricating-oil integrity, cooling, electrical distribution, remote control, alarms, fire boundaries, steering gear, shafting and local control. Tanker crews must also consider cargo containment, inert gas, pumping systems and ignition sources.
Test propulsion and steering progressively in coordination with the bridge and authorities. Define an operating envelope: available revolutions, permitted manoeuvres, systems on temporary supply, monitoring frequency and conditions that require stopping again. Record every temporary repair.
Flag, class and coastal-state requirements may affect whether the vessel proceeds, enters refuge or receives assistance. IMO guidance recognizes the master's professional judgment in seeking shelter, while also recognizing the coastal state's authority over port entry. “Proceed to next port” is not solely a chartering decision.
Preserve the commercial and casualty record
The master should issue timely notices without speculating about fault. Owners should alert hull and machinery, P&I and war-risk insurers in accordance with policy terms, and involve technical and legal advisers where appropriate. Charterers need reliable information about capability, delay, cargo and destination, not protected security detail that increases exposure.
Preserve:
- deck, engine and cargo logs; - voyage-data-recorder material; - alarms, maintenance history and test results; - navigation observations and communications; - damage photographs taken from safe positions; - orders from authorities; and - the chronology of failure, assistance, restart and testing.
Contract consequences may include off-hire, deviation, unsafe-port questions, delay, salvage, general average or frustration arguments. Their application depends on the charter, bills of lading, casualty facts and governing law. No operations dashboard should pre-judge them.
A controlled scenario
Consider a loaded tanker struck outbound near the traffic lanes. Propulsion, gyro input and one radar fail. Steering remains available on emergency power, and visual bearings show the vessel drifting toward the edge of the lane.
The defensible response is not a universal instruction to anchor or declare distress. The master establishes a trusted position, warns traffic and authorities, reports the ship's real manoeuvring status, assesses drift and anchoring exposure, and prepares towing data. Engineers isolate fire damage and restore limited propulsion. The ship then tests steering and control before any decision to continue.
This is a hypothetical training scenario, not a forecast of a particular vessel or attack.
Commercial conclusion
Loss of propulsion in Hormuz is not just machinery downtime. It is a fast-moving collision, security, pollution, salvage and contractual event.
Owners should pre-plan degraded-navigation fixes, NUC signaling, anchor thresholds, tow connections and shoreside authority. Charterers and traders should plan for delayed decisions without pressuring the bridge into premature movement. Brokers and insurers should distinguish “engine restarted” from “ship fit to proceed.”
ZeaClub can hold the shared chronology, evidence index, insurer notices and action owners. It cannot determine COLREG status, authorize a tow or certify seaworthiness. Those judgments remain with the master and the competent maritime authorities.
This article distinguishes verified source material from ZeaClub analysis, recommendations, forecasts and hypothetical scenarios.
Sources
- UKMTO Weekly VRA Overview, week ending 6 November 2026Accessed 2026-11-19
- Industry Guidance on the Safe Management of Vessel Transit through the Strait of Hormuz, May 2026Accessed 2026-11-19
- International Maritime Organization, Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at SeaAccessed 2026-11-19
- International Maritime Organization, Tanker safety and emergency towing arrangementsAccessed 2026-11-19
- IMO Resolution MSC.256(84), SOLAS emergency towing arrangementsAccessed 2026-11-19
- International Maritime Organization, Places of refugeAccessed 2026-11-19