Current guidance calls for broad preparation
The May 2026 Hormuz industry guidance identifies six shipboard drill areas: GNSS failure, steering gear, fire and damage control with medical response, abandon ship, security scenarios and loss of propulsion. It also recommends a company emergency-response exercise.
That list reflects the compound nature of the threat. A projectile strike may create fire, blackout, steering loss, casualties, navigation degradation and abandonment decisions at once.
The guidance also says drill outcomes should be reviewed and used to adjust procedures, considering conditions and personnel factors. It does not say that every drill must be a maximal full-scale event immediately before transit.
The company should distinguish a statutory drill, equipment test, tabletop, walk-through and integrated exercise. Each produces different evidence.
Start with competence and recent history
The master should review when each crew last performed the relevant task, whether key personnel changed, defects remain open and whether recent exercises exposed weaknesses.
A newly joined second engineer may justify a machinery walk-through. A bridge team that recently completed a strong GNSS-loss exercise may need only a briefing and equipment check. A failed fire-pump test demands corrective action, not another theoretical drill.
The plan should focus on the people and systems needed for the specific transit. Training records alone do not prove that the current watch can execute the response under darkness, congestion and communications interference.
Crew can be asked privately where they feel least prepared. Their answers often reveal more than a perfect drill checklist.
Protect hours of rest
The Maritime Labour Convention requires drills to minimize disturbance of rest periods and avoid inducing fatigue. It sets minimum rest standards and recognizes the master’s authority to require work for immediate safety, followed by adequate rest when normality returns.
Planned pre-transit preparation is not an excuse to create a predictable fatigue emergency. Watchkeepers, engineers and emergency-team leaders need sufficient rest for the transit and first response.
IMO’s fitness-for-duty principles require watch systems that do not impair efficiency through fatigue. The company should examine cumulative workload from cargo, pilotage, bunkering, security watches and drills, not each activity separately.
If readiness cannot be achieved without exhausting the crew, deferment, extra personnel or a different schedule may be the correct control.
Combine scenarios without creating chaos
An integrated exercise can test several interfaces efficiently. A GNSS anomaly can be followed by steering failure, a suspicious approach and a simulated impact that triggers fire and medical response.
The exercise needs boundaries. State which systems are simulated, which communications are real, whether alarms will sound and who can stop the drill. Do not disable navigation equipment, release extinguishing agents or create smoke in a way that endangers operations.
The scenario should unfold slowly enough for learning. An exercise that overwhelms everyone in the first minute may demonstrate overload but teach little.
Observers should capture decision times, communications, equipment access and coordination rather than grade theatrical realism.
Tabletop drills can test judgment
Some high-risk decisions are better rehearsed around a chart or bridge console. Examples include whether to activate SSAS, select Mayday or Pan-Pan, enter a citadel, abandon ship, accept a diversion order or assist another casualty under follow-on attack risk.
A tabletop can include the master, SSO, chief engineer, medical officer and CSO ashore. It can test source verification, authority calls, commercial pressure and handover without waking every seafarer.
Tabletops do not replace physical competence. Crews still need to know how to start an emergency generator, operate steering, rig fire equipment and launch survival craft. The drill matrix should show which objective requires hands-on performance.
Test degraded communications
A Gulf exercise should not assume perfect satellite, mobile and VHF service. The team should practice primary and backup channels, pre-drafted messages, position reporting without trusted GNSS and loss of contact with shore.
The CSO watch should participate. It needs to authenticate the ship, build a chronology, contact authorities and support other exposed vessels while avoiding duplicate instructions.
A communications drill should verify actual contact details without transmitting a false distress or security alert. SSAS tests require approved procedures and coordination with the receiving chain.
Protected SSP details should remain need-to-know. Observers and contractors do not need activation-point locations.
Include realistic crew protection
The security scenario should require bridge and deck teams to move to protected positions, use lighting and water-defense controls where fitted, and withdraw before an approaching threat reaches a defined range.
If ballistic PPE is part of the plan, users should fit it, communicate and move through escape routes. Heat and duration must be monitored.
Fire and medical response should account for damage that makes a normal route or muster station unavailable. The exercise can simulate unexploded ordnance by declaring an area prohibited, never by placing an ambiguous imitation device aboard without strict control.
Abandonment rehearsal should include people counts, lifejacket compatibility, documents, injured-person movement and receiving-craft communications.
Use stop criteria
The master or exercise director should stop or pause when real traffic, equipment alarms, weather, crew injury, distress traffic or an actual security report requires attention.
Participants need a clear phrase distinguishing exercise messages from real events. Real emergency language should not be used on external channels without prescribed exercise identification and authority.
A drill should also stop when its objective is met. Repeating a physically demanding evolution for appearance can add fatigue without learning.
No seafarer should be penalized for calling a safety stop in good faith. That behavior is part of a resilient safety culture.
Debrief while memory is fresh
A short hot debrief should capture what worked, what failed and which issue threatens the next transit. Individual observations can follow after rest.
Classify findings:
- critical before entry into the exposure area; - temporary control with master approval; - improvement for the next port; and - longer-term fleet lesson.
Assign each action an owner, deadline and verification method. “Crew reminded” is weak closure for a failed radio, inaccessible valve or unclear authority chain.
The company should adjust the voyage risk assessment when the drill contradicts an assumption about capability.
Do not drill through a defect
A failed steering changeover, emergency generator, SSAS test or fire pump is not simply a poor score. It may change voyage fitness.
The master, company, flag, class or other authority may need to determine repair or safe alternative arrangements. Commercial schedules cannot convert unavailable critical equipment into acceptable risk.
A successful workaround in a calm drill may not survive blast, blackout or heavy traffic. Record its limits and reconsider transit.
Charterers should receive operational consequences without protected security details. Insurers may require notification where readiness or voyage exposure materially changes.
Build a rolling program
The best preparation begins before the ship reaches the Gulf. Fleet exercises can rotate scenarios over preceding voyages, leaving the final pre-transit period for targeted refreshers, equipment tests and rest.
The company should track competence by role and scenario, not only by vessel and calendar date. Relief crews need equivalent readiness.
ZeaClub can maintain the drill matrix, rest-hour impact, findings, action owners and voyage-risk updates. It cannot certify competence, approve a defect or direct the master to proceed.
Commercial conclusion
There is no correct number of drills before Hormuz. There is a correct readiness outcome: rested watchkeepers, working critical systems, understood decisions and closed high-risk defects.
Owners should combine hands-on drills, table exercises and equipment tests according to recent performance. More rehearsal is not automatically safer. A tired crew with six signed forms may be less ready than a rested crew that fixed the one failure its targeted exercise exposed.
This article distinguishes verified source material from ZeaClub analysis, recommendations, forecasts and hypothetical scenarios.
Sources
- Industry Guidance on the Safe Management of Vessel Transit through the Strait of Hormuz, May 2026Accessed 2026-11-19
- Maritime Labour Convention, Standard A2.3Accessed 2026-11-19
- International Maritime Organization, Seafarers’ hours of work and restAccessed 2026-11-19
- ILO Convention No. 180, Seafarers’ Hours of Work and ManningAccessed 2026-11-19
- International Maritime Organization, Principles of Minimum Safe ManningAccessed 2026-11-19
- International Maritime Organization, FatigueAccessed 2026-11-19