Establish whether people are in distress
A damaged vessel is not automatically a search-and-rescue case. The key question is whether people are in danger and what assistance they need.
The bridge should monitor the distress channel and seek, without delaying its own safety response:
- ship identity and verified position; - nature and time of attack; - persons on board, injured, missing or in the water; - fire, flooding, pollution and cargo hazards; - propulsion, steering and communications status; - lifeboats or rafts launched; - continuing aerial, surface or projectile threat; - assistance requested; and - rescue-coordination authority already contacted.
A relayed Mayday can be valid when the casualty cannot transmit effectively. UKMTO reported a November incident after another merchant master relayed a Channel 16 Mayday stating that a vessel had been struck. The assisting ship should preserve the exact wording and source.
If communication fails, smoke, abandon-ship activity or persons in the water may establish distress. Uncertainty should be reported to the maritime rescue coordination centre rather than treated as proof that no help is needed.
Conduct a rapid risk assessment
The assessment should compare the benefit of the proposed assistance with danger to the assisting ship.
Threat factors include evidence of continuing attack, weapon type, unidentified craft or aircraft, nearby military activity, unexploded ordnance, mines, GNSS interference and whether the casualty is a predictable target.
Navigational factors include traffic, sea room, wind, current, visibility, shallow water and the damaged vessel’s drift. Fire can obscure other ships, and abandoned lifeboats can be difficult radar targets.
Ship factors include manoeuvrability, freeboard, rescue equipment, medical capability, dangerous cargo, crew numbers and ability to receive survivors without losing safe watchkeeping.
A tanker carrying flammable cargo may not be able to approach a burning casualty safely. A low-freeboard offshore vessel may recover people more effectively but be more vulnerable to blast or boarding.
The decision should identify what assistance is possible now, what becomes possible after the threat changes and which action would create unacceptable danger.
Use the least-exposing effective assistance
Assistance does not always mean coming alongside.
The ship can relay distress, maintain communications, mark the casualty’s position, provide weather and drift observations, act as an on-scene communications link, illuminate a safe area where appropriate or guide rescue assets.
If persons are in the water, the master can manoeuvre to create a lee, deploy lifebuoys or flotation devices, prepare rescue boats where safe, or position for recovery from the lowest suitable point. The exact method depends on ship design and conditions.
A rescue boat should not be launched into an active projectile, drone, mine or explosive-boat threat without careful assessment. It may strand additional crew away from the ship’s protection.
Coming alongside a burning or structurally damaged vessel can expose both ships to fire, explosion, collision and cargo release. Towing also requires proper equipment, connection planning and knowledge of the casualty’s condition.
The chosen method should be reviewed continuously as the threat, fire and survivor condition change.
Keep watching for a follow-on attack
The rescue bridge team must maintain separate navigation, security and communications functions. Fixation on survivors can leave the ship blind to an incoming threat.
Lookouts should cover air and surface sectors. Radar should monitor small craft and other traffic. GNSS positions should be cross-checked, particularly if electronic interference is reported.
The assisting ship should avoid unnecessary stationary time and maintain propulsion readiness. JMIC’s March assessment identified increased exposure for vessels providing support near a recently affected ship. That assessment was time-specific, but it demonstrates why rescue plans need a follow-on threat trigger.
If a new attack begins, the master may need to break off, move survivors already recovered to protected positions and report the changed situation. Ending an unsafe approach is not abandonment if continuing would place more lives in serious danger.
The ship should not assume that a military unit’s presence guarantees protection.
Prepare to receive survivors safely
Rescue creates medical, security and stability demands aboard the assisting ship.
The crew should prepare recovery points, stretchers, first aid, burn treatment, blankets, water and protected accommodation. Personal protective equipment may be needed for smoke, fuel or chemical exposure.
Recovered people should be counted and identified as circumstances permit. Immediate triage takes priority over documentation. The casualty master or senior surviving officer may help account for missing persons.
The ship should assess whether survivors or debris carry hazardous contamination. Security screening must be humane and proportionate; people rescued from an attacked ship should not be treated as suspects without cause.
Additional persons affect lifesaving capacity, food, water and accommodation. The company and MRCC need updated numbers and medical needs.
Crew performing recovery may experience traumatic stress and fatigue. Relief should be planned once the immediate operation permits.
Manage fire, pollution and dangerous cargo boundaries
The casualty’s cargo and bunker information can determine whether close approach is possible. Toxic gas, vapour clouds, explosion risk, burning containers or oil on the water can extend far beyond the hull.
The assisting ship should approach from a safe sector considering wind and current. Its own ventilation and ignition controls may need adjustment under the emergency plan.
No crew should board the casualty without authority, competence, equipment and a clear safety purpose. Unexploded ordnance or damaged cargo can make the deck unsafe even after the fire appears controlled.
Pollution observation should be reported, but pollution response must not displace rescue of life. Samples or photographs are secondary to safety.
IMO’s places-of-refuge guidelines distinguish rescue of persons from management of a ship needing assistance. After people are safe, coastal authorities, salvors, owners and insurers can address towage, refuge and pollution.
Preserve the operational and commercial record
The assisting ship should log distress messages, authority communications, threat assessments, manoeuvres, persons recovered, equipment used, fuel, damage and the reasons for any delayed or aborted approach.
VDR, radar, ECDIS, CCTV and communications records should be preserved. Public statements should not identify attackers or casualty details beyond verified authority information.
Owners should notify insurers and charterers under applicable terms. Rescue deviation, fuel, stores, damage, medical diversion and lost time may have contractual and insurance consequences. The duty to save life must not be distorted by a prior commercial argument.
Cargo interests need revised arrival information only after the rescue situation and next destination are clear. Brokers should avoid circulating survivor names or unverified casualty counts.
ZeaClub can present the master with current contacts, capability checklists and a time-stamped decision log. It cannot decide that an attack area is safe or substitute for MRCC coordination and the master’s judgment.
Commercial conclusion
A merchant ship has a strong duty to assist people in distress, but the duty is expressly conditioned by danger to the assisting ship and those aboard.
The master should alert rescue authorities, establish survivor needs, assess the continuing threat and provide the most effective assistance that does not create a second casualty. Sometimes that means immediate recovery. Sometimes it means communications, position marking and waiting for protected rescue assets.
The defensible decision is neither automatic approach nor automatic avoidance. It is a continuously reviewed rescue plan centered on saving life without exposing more lives recklessly.
This article distinguishes verified source material from ZeaClub analysis, recommendations, forecasts and hypothetical scenarios.
Sources
- International Maritime Organization, Legal Committee rules on assistance and SOLAS V/33Accessed 2026-11-19
- International Maritime Organization, Search and Rescue Convention overviewAccessed 2026-11-19
- Joint Maritime Information Center, Advisory Update 007Accessed 2026-11-19
- Industry Guidance on the Safe Management of Vessel Transit through the Strait of Hormuz, May 2026Accessed 2026-11-19
- International Maritime Organization, Resolution A.1184(33) on places of refugeAccessed 2026-11-19
- UKMTO, recent incidentsAccessed 2026-11-19