Detect the contact before it enters the close-range picture
A low, small or partly submerged craft may be difficult to see in sea clutter. Detection needs deliberate radar and visual coverage rather than reliance on AIS.
The bridge should use suitable short and medium radar ranges, guard zones where appropriate and settings tested against known small targets. X-band radar may offer useful resolution in suitable conditions, while rain, sea state, blind sectors and target aspect can reduce detection.
Dedicated visual lookouts should scan sectors not obscured by the ship’s structure. Thermal or optical equipment can supplement observation if fitted, but it does not prove whether a craft is crewed or armed.
The team should record:
- first bearing and range; - relative movement and closing speed; - apparent size, freeboard, colour and shape; - wake, engine sound, lights and aerials; - visible occupants or their absence; - erratic, intercepting or station-keeping behaviour; - correlation with AIS or radar tracks; and - other contacts that may be coordinating with it.
“No visible crew” is not the same as “uncrewed.” A person can be concealed by low freeboard, darkness or viewing angle.
Classify behaviour, not appearance alone
A commercial autonomous craft may follow a programmed route and still create a collision risk. A crewed boat can be used as an explosive weapon. The bridge should assess what the contact does.
Higher-concern behaviours include accelerating toward the ship, repeatedly adjusting to intercept, aiming at the side or stern, ignoring collision-avoidance indications, operating without normal lights, approaching with other craft or appearing after suspicious electronic interference.
A contact crossing at steady bearing and speed may still require ordinary COLREG action. The team should avoid labeling every small craft hostile merely because it lacks AIS.
The assessment can use graduated language: unknown contact, suspicious approach, probable remote craft, or imminent attack. Each label should state the evidence and time.
Authority information may confirm military exercises, port operations or a reported threat. The bridge should request clarification through established channels without delaying necessary protective action.
Protect people and prepare for impact
Nonessential crew should leave open decks and exposed windows. The ship’s plan should identify protected locations that do not interfere with navigation, engineering or damage control.
Watertight integrity should be increased. Fire, flooding, medical and emergency-power teams should be placed at readiness from protected positions. Cargo and bunker arrangements determine which spaces present the greatest consequence.
A suspected explosive craft may aim near the waterline, engine room or cargo area. The crew cannot know the exact objective, so the response must preserve broad resilience.
The bridge and engine room should maintain communications and prepare for steering, propulsion or electrical loss. A second radar or independent navigation method may be needed if blast damages antennas or bridge systems.
Crew should not gather on one side to watch or film the approach. A near miss can still cause blast or fragments.
Report before certainty becomes impact
A suspicious intercept should be reported early through UKMTO and the applicable flag, coastal or naval coordination channels. The report should include verified ship position, course, speed, contact bearing and range, observed behaviour, action taken and assistance required.
The bridge should avoid describing the object as explosive unless evidence supports that assessment. “Low-profile craft repeatedly altering to intercept; no crew visible” communicates the hazard without false attribution.
For US-flagged ships, MARAD calls for immediate SSAS activation and contact with the Fifth Fleet Battle Watch and UKMTO following an attack, incident or suspicious activity. Other vessels should follow their own flag and approved ship security plan.
VHF calls to the contact may be appropriate under procedures, but an absent response proves little. The craft may be unmanned, communications may fail or the channel may be wrong.
Authorities need updates as the contact changes course, stops, impacts or departs. Nearby ships can then receive a timely warning.
Expect a combined or diversionary event
A USV may not be the only threat. It can be paired with small boats, aerial surveillance, projectiles, GNSS interference or deceptive VHF calls.
Lookouts should continue searching all sectors. The bridge should not move the entire team to one radar or wing. One officer needs the integrated navigation picture while others track the security contact and communications.
A false AIS target can lure a ship toward a real surface hazard. Radar and visual information should lead the contact assessment. GNSS-derived ship position should be independently checked.
The company’s shore team can review current warnings and notify authorities without burdening the bridge. It should not send speculative instructions based on a public tracking screen.
After one craft passes, readiness should remain until the surrounding picture is clear and the authority assesses no related threat.
Do not approach, recover or tow the object
A stopped, damaged or drifting craft may remain explosive, remotely observed or booby-trapped. It can also be evidence.
The merchant ship should maintain safe distance and await authority instructions. Crew should not launch a rescue boat merely to inspect an apparently empty object.
If people are in the water, the master faces a life-saving decision that must account for the continuing threat. Authorities should be contacted immediately, and rescue options assessed without placing more lives into an active attack zone.
Any debris that reaches the ship should not be handled casually. The area should be isolated, photographed from safety where possible and reported. Specialists may need to address unexploded or hazardous material.
A collision or near impact requires inspection for hull, propeller, rudder and intake damage when safe. The absence of an explosion does not prove no damage occurred.
Preserve evidence and review the voyage
Useful evidence includes radar plots, VDR, CCTV, photographs, VHF recordings, GNSS anomalies, machinery data and witness accounts. Original timestamps and source devices should be preserved.
The ship’s first report, later authority classification and technical findings should remain distinct. A contact initially recorded as suspicious may later be confirmed harmless or hostile.
The voyage assessment must then be refreshed. The company should consider whether the location remains usable, whether another movement window is advised and whether the ship disclosed a predictable waiting pattern.
Insurers should receive notices required by policy, especially after evasive deviation, damage or contact. Charterers need factual timing and safety information without unsupported blame.
ZeaClub can combine radar-observation fields, authority reports and route triggers, and link possible related events. It cannot determine from one image that a craft is explosive or direct an evasive manoeuvre.
Commercial conclusion
A suspected USV is both a collision problem and a security problem. The bridge cannot solve one by ignoring the other.
Early detection, behaviour-based assessment, safe speed and manoeuvring, crew shelter and immediate reporting provide the strongest merchant-ship response. The team must continue watching for combined threats and preserve safe navigation throughout.
The object should never be approached for curiosity or evidence. Distance, disciplined reporting and authority coordination are more valuable than a close look at an unknown craft.
This article distinguishes verified source material from ZeaClub analysis, recommendations, forecasts and hypothetical scenarios.
Sources
- US Maritime Administration, Advisory 2026-011Accessed 2026-11-19
- Industry Guidance on the Safe Management of Vessel Transit through the Strait of Hormuz, May 2026Accessed 2026-11-19
- Joint Maritime Information Center, Advisory Update 007Accessed 2026-11-19
- International Maritime Organization, Convention on the COLREGsAccessed 2026-11-19
- International Maritime Organization, EmS Guide and integrated emergency planningAccessed 2026-11-19