Give each radar a primary job

MCA guidance says that where two radars are fitted, good practice in congested, restricted-visibility or shallow waters is to designate one for collision avoidance and the other for navigation. If only one has automatic target tracking, that unit should normally perform the anti-collision role.

The collision-avoidance radar should support systematic target acquisition, relative movement, CPA and TCPA assessment and trial manoeuvres where fitted. The navigation radar should support coastline identification, ranges and bearings, parallel indexing and position-integrity checks.

The bridge briefing should state which radar performs each role, who operates it, what range and stabilisation are intended and when the roles change.

Use different ranges to see different problems

A longer range provides earlier notice of approaching traffic, congestion and route conditions. A shorter range improves resolution of nearby craft, navigation marks and close-quarters movement. Medium ranges help connect the two pictures.

The industry guidance proposes a 3/6/12-nautical-mile split as a readiness check. That is useful context, not a universal configuration. The correct scales depend on own speed, traffic, weather, antenna height, route geometry and equipment.

A ship moving quickly toward a crowded merge needs enough long-range warning to slow or delay before commitment. Once inside a constrained sector, short-range monitoring becomes critical for small craft and passing distances. Periodic scanning beyond the primary scale should continue even when one display is dedicated to close traffic.

Range changes require attention to pulse length, gain, rain and sea clutter. A longer pulse may aid detection at distance but merge nearby echoes. A short-range display poorly tuned for sea clutter can lose the small craft it was intended to find.

The operator should not assume an automatic setting is optimal. Equipment performance and the actual sea return must be checked.

Exploit the difference between X and S band

Many large ships carry X-band and S-band radar. X band generally provides higher resolution and stronger small-target and coastline detail in suitable conditions. S band often performs better at longer range and through heavy rain or sea clutter.

The bridge should decide which band best fits collision and navigation duties in the prevailing conditions, then test that choice against observed targets. If rain begins or clutter rises, the allocation may need to change.

Blind and shadow sectors caused by masts, cranes or other structures should be displayed near each radar and understood by the operators. The sectors may differ between antennas. A contact absent from one display but present on the other may reflect geometry, not spoofing or target disappearance.

Regular performance-monitor checks and known-target comparisons provide evidence that both sets are working as expected.

Separate navigation from collision inputs

For coastal navigation, ground stabilisation can show fixed objects as stationary and help track movement over the ground. For collision avoidance, sea stabilisation using heading and speed through the water may better show target aspect.

The exact configuration depends on equipment and procedures. Operators must know which heading, speed and position sources feed each radar. If both displays depend on the same corrupted GNSS input, two screens do not provide independent position verification.

Current Hormuz guidance reports GNSS spoofing and jamming. A radar image overlay that no longer aligns with official charted features can reveal a position or heading problem, but the mismatch must be diagnosed. The team should not drag the radar picture to fit a suspect electronic position.

Parallel indexes referenced to verified fixed targets can show whether the ship remains on the intended track. They do not show progress along the track and do not replace position fixes. Index lines must also be checked after a range-scale or display-mode change.

The navigation operator should report any mismatch immediately and preserve the last reliable fix under the ship’s procedure.

Avoid splitting the bridge into two isolated teams

Separate radar roles can create separate mental pictures. The anti-collision operator may see a deteriorating CPA while the navigation operator sees the ship approaching a cross-track limit. The conning officer needs both before ordering a manoeuvre.

The bridge should use concise reporting standards: target bearing and range, verified identity if needed, CPA and TCPA with source, trend, route margin and recommended escalation. Reports should distinguish radar-tracked data from AIS information.

One qualified officer should maintain the integrated picture. The master or conning officer decides action; radar operators supply evidence and challenge inconsistency. Closed-loop orders should confirm which display and target are being discussed.

At defined intervals and before critical points, the operators should compare:

- significant targets on each radar; - sensor and stabilisation inputs; - heading-marker alignment; - position and parallel-index agreement; - clutter and gain settings; - alarms and acquisition status; and - known blind sectors.

If the displays disagree materially, the team should slow or delay as appropriate while investigating rather than select the more convenient answer.

Do not let automatic tracking hide uncertainty

ARPA and automatic tracking need time and stable observations to calculate reliable vectors. Course or speed changes by either vessel make earlier predictions stale. Dense traffic can also overload the operator with acquired targets, vectors and alarms.

The bridge should acquire relevant targets early, clear passed targets under approved procedures and avoid a display so crowded that real echoes are obscured. Automatic acquisition can help but may miss weak targets or create nuisance tracks in clutter.

AIS overlays should be treated as supporting information. A plausible AIS vector can be wrong, duplicated or spoofed. The operator must know whether the selected target data are radar-generated or AIS-derived.

When one radar loses heading or speed input, the display mode and vector meaning may change. The operator should announce the failure, identify the remaining usable functions and follow the defect and contingency plan.

Plan for one-radar operation

The pre-transit risk assessment should state whether the voyage may proceed if one radar fails, considering statutory carriage requirements, visibility, traffic, navigation integrity and the remaining unit’s capability. This decision should not be invented after entering the Strait.

A failure may remove automatic tracking, independent range coverage, a radar band or the navigation cross-check needed during GNSS interference. The remaining radar may have to alternate between collision and navigation functions, increasing workload and leaving temporary gaps.

The company should define master and shore notification, flag or class consultation, route review and abort criteria. A defect affecting mandatory equipment may require repair or other formal action. The ship should follow its applicable requirements.

The bridge team should practise changing roles and range scales on the remaining set. It should know which parallel indexes, guard zones and target tracks are lost during the transition.

Commercial pressure to complete a slot is not a sufficient reason to accept an unassessed loss of redundancy.

Preserve a usable technical and voyage record

The record should show pre-transit tests, radar assignments, primary ranges, sensor inputs, defects, alarms and material changes. During an incident it should preserve plots, screenshots or voyage data under company procedures without distracting the bridge.

A missed target should not automatically be described as equipment failure. Clutter, blind sector, target aspect, tuning, range selection and operator action need investigation.

Owners and insurers need evidence of maintenance, familiarisation and defect management. Charterers need clear notice when equipment condition changes the voyage. Allocation of delay and repair cost depends on contract wording and facts.

ZeaClub can link test records, radar-role plans, defects, sensor status and incident evidence in one controlled voyage workspace. It can flag that both radars share a failed input or that a required check is overdue, but it should not tune equipment or make collision decisions.

Commercial conclusion

Two radars add value when they provide complementary range, band, function and operator attention. They add little when both show the same crowded scale and inherit the same bad data.

Owners should require a phase-specific radar plan, trained operators and a one-radar contingency. Masters should reconcile navigation and collision pictures before every critical manoeuvre. Charterers should recognise that a radar or input failure can invalidate the transit plan even if one screen remains lit.

The strongest Hormuz configuration is not simply “both on.” It is one coherent bridge picture built from deliberately different views, continuously cross-checked and backed by a safe response when the views no longer agree.

This article distinguishes verified source material from ZeaClub analysis, recommendations, forecasts and hypothetical scenarios.

Sources