Understand what is being overlaid
A full radar-image overlay transfers radar returns onto the ECDIS chart display. Fixed coastlines, islands and navigation marks should broadly align with their charted features when position, heading, scale, projection, orientation and offsets are correct.
IMO ECDIS performance standards require transferred radar information to match the chart in scale, projection and orientation and remain removable by a single operator action. The radar layer must not degrade the underlying ENC information.
The watchkeeper should know whether the system shows a raw radar image, tracked targets, AIS targets or a combination. A cluttered display can hide safety contours, route boundaries and small echoes. Removing a layer to regain clarity is not losing information if the dedicated radar remains properly monitored.
Establish a trusted baseline before the Strait
Overlay checks are most useful when the bridge knows what correct alignment looks like. Before entering the high-risk area, the team should compare the radar picture with verified charted objects and record any normal offset or limitation.
The checks should include:
- corrected official ENC and appropriate display scale; - correct chart datum and sensor configuration; - gyro error and heading-marker alignment; - radar performance, tuning and known blind sectors; - GNSS receiver and integrity indications; - radar-antenna and position-sensor offsets; - ECDIS orientation, motion mode and projection; and - identity of the fixed objects used for comparison.
A vessel with a large antenna offset can show an apparent discrepancy if the system does not compensate correctly. A slight heading error can rotate the radar picture around own ship and create growing mismatch with distance.
The bridge should also test how the equipment behaves when the position source is changed or lost. Familiarity gained during a live spoofing event is too late.
Recognise patterns, not one imperfect edge
Spoofing can produce a plausible but false position that drifts or jumps. If own-ship position moves while the real coastline does not, the radar image may shift consistently away from multiple charted features.
A single poorly matching shoreline is weaker evidence. Coastline shape can vary with tide, radar resolution and chart generalisation. Sand, low relief, rain clutter or shadowing can also affect the return.
Confidence increases when several independent signs agree:
1. multiple fixed radar returns share a consistent chart offset; 2. visual bearings conflict with the displayed position; 3. echo-sounder trends do not match charted depth; 4. GNSS receivers show implausible motion, time or quality changes; 5. AIS targets conflict with radar and visual observations; and 6. dead reckoning from the last reliable fix diverges from GNSS in a plausible direction.
Multiple GNSS receivers showing the same position do not prove integrity if they receive the same spoofed signal. Independence must be functional, not merely a second screen.
The bridge should label the event as suspected interference until evidence supports a firmer conclusion. A mismatch proves inconsistency; it does not automatically identify the cause or actor.
Diagnose heading, position and chart separately
The shape of the mismatch can help diagnosis, but it is not conclusive.
A near-uniform translation of radar returns relative to the chart may indicate position offset. A rotational mismatch increasing away from own ship may point to heading or orientation error. A local mismatch confined to one feature may reflect chart or radar limitations.
The bridge should check gyro repeaters, heading source, speed input, radar heading marker, antenna offset and ECDIS sensor status. It should compare both radars if fitted and use visual bearings or celestial methods when available.
Parallel indexes can show whether the ship maintains a planned relationship with a known fixed object independently of the displayed GNSS position. They do not identify progress along track, so periodic fixes remain necessary.
The team must not manually shift the chart or apply an arbitrary offset merely to make the overlay look correct. Any controlled position correction should follow approved equipment and company procedures and be supported by verified observations.
Keep collision avoidance on the radar unit
An ECDIS overlay helps situational awareness, but collision decisions should be made from the dedicated radar and systematic visual observations. Data transferred to ECDIS may be delayed, transformed or confused with AIS-derived vectors.
The radar operator should continue acquiring and tracking relevant contacts, checking CPA and TCPA and monitoring course or speed changes. The conning officer should know whether a displayed vector is ARPA, AIS or another source.
A false own-ship position can move the chart beneath real radar echoes, but relative radar movement between own ship and another vessel may remain useful if heading and radar performance are sound. True vectors and stabilisation, however, can be affected by bad heading or speed inputs.
The bridge should apply COLREG on the basis of all available reliable means. It should not make a large avoiding turn toward a charted hazard simply because an AIS ghost appears on the overlaid screen.
Define recovery, reporting and route criteria
The plan should state what evidence is required before GNSS is trusted again. A valid-looking receiver indication alone is insufficient. Position should agree over time with independent fixes, depth, radar and the expected track.
If the ship cannot establish the minimum required integrity, it should use its abort, delay or contingency route rather than continue on a guessed position. The applicable authority should be notified under current procedures, along with UKMTO, flag, company and other services as required.
The report should include UTC time, last reliable position, observed mismatch, receiver and alarm status, independent fixes, operational effects and whether spoofing or jamming is suspected. Attribution should not be asserted without verified evidence.
For US-flagged ships, current MARAD guidance calls for reporting anomalous behaviour and close NCAGS coordination. Other flags must follow their own requirements.
Route and insurer approvals may need review if the vessel deviates, delays or loses required equipment capability.
Preserve evidence without contaminating it
Screenshots, radar recordings, ECDIS logs, GNSS receiver data, alarms and voyage data can support investigation. They should be preserved under approved procedures and accurate time references.
The log should distinguish the raw observation from the conclusion. “Radar coastline displayed 0.4 nautical miles east of ENC coastline” is an observation. “Iran spoofed the vessel” is an attribution that requires separate evidence.
Operators should also record configuration changes made during troubleshooting. Otherwise, investigators may not know whether a later alignment resulted from signal recovery, sensor switching or manual adjustment.
ZeaClub can assemble the sensor timeline, screenshots, route versions, authority reports and commercial notices in a controlled incident file. It can flag simultaneous GNSS anomalies across a fleet, but it should not automatically declare spoofing or overwrite shipboard position.
Commercial conclusion
Radar overlay is one of the best rapid checks for a GNSS-dependent ECDIS picture in coastal waters, but its value comes from comparison and diagnosis. It is not an independent truth machine.
Owners should ensure that officers understand sensor inputs, offsets and display modes before entering Hormuz. Charterers should accept delay when position integrity falls below the passage plan’s minimum. Insurers need a clear technical record rather than an unsupported attribution.
The safe sequence is to notice the mismatch, stabilise the ship, verify position by independent means, isolate the faulty input and resume only when the route can be monitored reliably. Making two pictures line up is not the objective. Proving where the ship is remains the objective.
This article distinguishes verified source material from ZeaClub analysis, recommendations, forecasts and hypothetical scenarios.
Sources
- Industry Guidance on the Safe Management of Vessel Transit through the Strait of Hormuz, May 2026Accessed 2026-11-19
- UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency, MGN 379 Amendment 1: Use of Electronic Navigational AidsAccessed 2026-11-19
- International Maritime Organization, Resolution MSC.232(82): Revised ECDIS Performance StandardsAccessed 2026-11-19
- Joint Maritime Information Center, Update 018, 18 March 2026Accessed 2026-11-19
- US Maritime Administration, Advisory 2026-011Accessed 2026-11-19
- International Maritime Organization, Electronic Nautical Charts and ECDISAccessed 2026-11-19