Treat the limits as escalation triggers
A company minimum gives the officer of the watch a clear threshold for calling the master and acting before a situation becomes critical. It should not become a target distance that the ship deliberately accepts in every encounter.
The safety management system should define baseline expectations and the master should adjust them for the voyage. A larger margin may be needed for a deeply laden tanker, restricted visibility, high closing speed or uncertain target behaviour. In a constrained route, the available passing distance may be smaller, which increases the need for early speed or sequencing decisions before entry.
TCPA matters because the same CPA can present very different urgency. A target predicted to pass in four minutes demands a different response from one 40 minutes away. Yet a long TCPA prediction is also less certain because either vessel can alter before the closest point.
The bridge should define more than one trigger: monitoring, master call, avoiding-action review, no-entry or abort. That gives the team graduated responses rather than waiting for one alarm to decide the case.
Build the prediction from reliable inputs
ARPA calculations depend on measured range and bearing plus own-ship heading and speed inputs. Errors in gyro, log or stabilisation can distort true vectors and CPA. A newly acquired target also needs time to settle before the prediction becomes reliable.
The MCA’s electronic-navigation guidance warns that full smoothed accuracy may take several minutes and that slight own-ship data errors can seriously affect interpretation, especially with near-reciprocal targets. An apparent safe CPA should therefore be checked through systematic observation.
Course or speed alterations invalidate the earlier steady-state assumption. The team should allow the plot to stabilise, continue observing and not assume that the first post-manoeuvre vector proves the action sufficient.
Keep AIS out of the primary calculation
AIS can identify a vessel and add useful declared data. It should not be the primary source for collision avoidance. The signal can contain erroneous course, speed, heading or dimensions, and official regional guidance reports spoofing and false targets.
MARAD’s GPS and AIS advisory states that AIS should never be solely relied upon for collision-avoidance or navigational decisions. MCA guidance similarly prioritises systematic visual and radar observations.
On an integrated display, the officer must know whether the selected CPA and TCPA come from radar tracking or AIS data. Two values for the same apparent target may differ because of sensor inputs, update rates and whether data represent movement over the ground or through the water.
A “ghost” AIS target without radar or visual correlation should be investigated, not automatically avoided by a large course change into real traffic. Conversely, a small craft with no AIS may still present the most immediate collision risk.
When GNSS is unreliable, own-ship AIS position and course-over-ground can also be wrong. That can corrupt the traffic picture on other vessels as well as on shore.
Adapt the threshold to the encounter
The master’s standing orders should explain factors that increase the desired margin:
- high relative or closing speed; - large turning circle or stopping distance; - deep draft or limited lateral sea room; - hazardous or polluting cargo; - erratic target movement; - multiple simultaneous encounters; - small craft or weak radar returns; - restricted visibility, weather or glare; - degraded heading, speed or position inputs; and - proximity to route entry, exit, bend or choke point.
The team should also consider ship domain around the stern and sides. An overtake that predicts an acceptable beam CPA may still cut in too close ahead. A crossing vessel may pass at the minimum distance but leave no room for a third target.
Where traffic compression forces predictions below normal limits, the ship should assess whether to delay entry, reduce speed early, seek sequencing or use an approved contingency. Quietly changing the alarm setting to stop repeated warnings is not risk control.
Manage multiple unstable targets
Hormuz traffic may include tankers, gas carriers, container ships, coasters, dhows, fishing craft and military units with very different performance. When several CPAs change together, the officer can become fixated on the smallest displayed number.
The bridge should prioritise by actual collision risk, time available, reliability of the track and the consequences of action. A manoeuvre to improve one CPA must be tested against every relevant target and against route boundaries.
The industry guidance describes CPA instability affecting multiple contacts as an indicator for extreme-congestion mode. That is a planning control in the guidance, not a universal legal threshold. The master may need enhanced bridge manning or delayed entry with fewer targets.
One officer should maintain the traffic plot while the conning officer manages the vessel. A dedicated lookout and radar plotter can reduce overload. External communications should be assigned so that VHF hails do not interrupt collision assessment.
If the team cannot maintain a coherent picture, the safe response may be to reduce speed, stop the approach or use the pre-planned waiting option before entering constrained water.
Use alarms without becoming alarm-driven
CPA, TCPA and guard-zone alarms support watchkeeping. They do not replace visual and radar observation or professional judgment.
Limits should be selected for the operating area and tested before the transit. Overly small limits warn too late. Excessively broad limits can create continuous alarms, encourage acknowledgement without analysis and mask the contact that matters.
Alarm changes should be authorised and recorded under the ship’s system. A watchkeeper should not reduce the CPA setting simply because congestion makes the normal alarm inconvenient. If the limit is operationally unattainable, that is evidence that entry or continuation needs reassessment.
The master’s call criteria should include a target predicted below the adjusted minimum, uncertainty about the applicable rule, unreliable sensor inputs, multiple unstable CPAs and any need to depart from the passage plan.
Take action before the calculation becomes precise
COLREG Rule 7 warns against assumptions based on scanty information. Rule 8 requires avoiding action to be positive, made in ample time and with due regard to good seamanship.
The bridge should not wait for CPA to settle at a dangerously small value before acting. Early speed adjustment or a substantial course alteration, where safe and compliant with the route, is often clearer and more effective than repeated small changes.
Action should be monitored until the other vessel is finally past and clear. A temporarily improved CPA can deteriorate after the target alters or the ship returns to track.
If route constraints prevent effective action, the vessel should use its abort or coordination plan rather than assume another ship will compensate.
Record decisions and commercial effects
The passage record should preserve relevant radar plots or screenshots under company procedures, sensor status, alarm settings, observations, orders, communications and reasons for action. It should identify whether figures came from radar or AIS.
A near miss should not be hidden as “CPA alarm.” Applicable company, flag, coastal-state and insurer reporting requirements should be followed. Facts, allegations and later conclusions should remain separate.
For commercial teams, the record explains speed reduction, missed slots and fuel changes. Whether time or cost is recoverable depends on the contract and facts. The bridge should not be pressed to accept a smaller CPA to protect an ETA.
ZeaClub can link the voyage-specific CPA policy, master’s standing orders, sensor checks, traffic events and charter notices. It can flag a threshold breach or data-source conflict, but it should not issue collision-avoidance commands or label a numerical CPA safe.
Commercial conclusion
CPA and TCPA limits are useful only when they trigger early thought and action. They cannot convert an uncertain prediction into a safe encounter.
Owners should provide clear baseline guidance, trained teams and functioning sensors. Masters should adjust thresholds to the ship and conditions. Charterers should treat traffic delay as a foreseeable part of a severe and congested operating environment.
The best Hormuz policy is not the smallest number the route can physically tolerate. It is a conservative, vessel-specific system that recognises prediction error, calls the master early and preserves enough time and sea room for an unmistakable avoiding action.
This article distinguishes verified source material from ZeaClub analysis, recommendations, forecasts and hypothetical scenarios.
Sources
- International Maritime Organization, Convention on the COLREGsAccessed 2026-11-19
- Industry Guidance on the Safe Management of Vessel Transit through the Strait of Hormuz, May 2026Accessed 2026-11-19
- UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency, MGN 379 Amendment 1: Use of Electronic Navigational AidsAccessed 2026-11-19
- UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency, MGN 369 Amendment 1: Navigation in Restricted VisibilityAccessed 2026-11-19
- US Maritime Administration, Advisory 2023-005: GPS Interference and AIS SpoofingAccessed 2026-11-19
- US Maritime Administration, Advisory 2026-011Accessed 2026-11-19
- UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency, Bridge Navigational Safety and Risk of CollisionAccessed 2026-11-19