Why the declared cargo is not the whole picture

As of October 14, 2026, the 2025 fire aboard the bulk carrier Altay offers a pointed lesson for anyone arranging a scrap-metal shipment. The vessel was loading scrap at Hull, England, when its master saw smoke rising from the cargo. The UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) concluded that an undischarged battery or another ignition source likely sparked during loading and ignited combustible material. Its finding describes a likely cause, not a positively identified battery.

MAIB reported that the cargo had been classified as Group C scrap metal under the International Maritime Solid Bulk Cargoes (IMSBC) Code. Yet the scrap contained batteries, oil drums and oily residues that posed a fire risk. The distinction matters: a classification and cargo description cannot, by themselves, show that every item in a mixed stream belongs there. IMO describes the IMSBC Code as a framework for identifying solid-bulk-cargo hazards and the procedures for safe shipment; the physical cargo presented for loading still needs attention.

Cargo hold fire on the bulk carrier Altay while loading scrap metal · International Maritime Solid Bulk Cargoes (IMSBC) Code

Start the conversation upstream

For a proposed scrap fixture, a useful question is not simply whether the cargo is called scrap metal. Ask the shipper and loading side how incoming material is checked, what unwanted items they are looking for, and what happens when one is found. These are practical due-diligence questions, not a claim that one screening method is prescribed for every shipment.

Altay’s scrap came from several sources. According to MAIB, the receiving company expected its suppliers to remove hazardous material such as batteries and combustibles. Deliveries to Hull were visually checked on arrival, but there was no additional sorting and screening facility to ensure contaminants were absent. That finding suggests a useful handoff test: identify who actually checks the material at each stage, rather than treating an expectation placed on an earlier supplier as proof that the loading stream has been cleared.

Cargo hold fire on the bulk carrier Altay while loading scrap metal

Keep a decision point at the berth

Before transfer begins, the ship and terminal can agree whom to contact if an observer sees a battery, closed drum, oily material, smoke or another suspect item in the stream. They can also decide how to pause the affected transfer and have the material assessed without asking crew to handle an unidentified object. This is a suggested operating conversation, not a universal checklist or a substitute for the ship’s and terminal’s emergency procedures.

Observation has limits: a visible check cannot establish that everything buried in a grab or pile is free of contaminants. It can, however, create an opportunity to act on what is seen. Following the Altay incident, MAIB reported that the vessel’s operator highlighted cargo-loading monitoring and pre-loading inspection to its crews. The IMO’s BLU Code provides broader guidance to masters and terminals on safe bulk loading and unloading; it does not turn a watch at the hatch into a guarantee about cargo composition.

Cargo hold fire on the bulk carrier Altay while loading scrap metal · BLU Code and BLU Manual

Fire risk is not the only loading concern

Scrap also calls for attention to how heavy pieces enter a hold. In its guidance on bulk-carrier loading, the UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) advises special care at the start of loading scrap metal in each hold to avoid heavy drops that could damage the tank top. It describes starting with smaller items until the tank top is covered to a reasonable height and avoiding high free-fall drops of heavy concentrated loads. This is identified here as UK guidance, not presented as a worldwide loading rule.

The two concerns should not be confused. A careful drop sequence addresses possible structural damage; it does not screen out a battery or an oil drum. Equally, a discussion about contaminants does not replace the ship–terminal loading arrangements needed to protect the vessel. Treating both questions explicitly gives the master and terminal representative a better basis for deciding what to check before and during transfer.

Cargo hold fire on the bulk carrier Altay while loading scrap metal · Annex B: Loading, Unloading and Stowage of Solid Bulk Cargoes and the BLU Code · BLU Code and BLU Manual

If something changes, preserve the facts

If smoke or suspect material appears, the immediate priority is to use the agreed ship-and-terminal response, rather than continue loading while its significance is debated. On Altay, the master raised the alarm after seeing smoke, and shore and ship personnel became involved in the response. The fire caused significant heat damage to hold structure; there were no injuries or deaths. The incident demonstrates the potential seriousness of a problem discovered while the vessel is still alongside, without establishing a response technique suitable for every cargo or fire.

A useful follow-up record would identify the observed item or condition, when and where it was noticed, which transfer was affected, and who made the next decision. That is a practical suggestion for reconstructing the cargo’s route and the operational response, not an additional IMSBC reporting requirement. The central lesson is to keep the declared description, the actual loading stream and the ship–shore response connected throughout the operation.

Cargo hold fire on the bulk carrier Altay while loading scrap metal · International Maritime Solid Bulk Cargoes (IMSBC) Code · BLU Code and BLU Manual