The threat categories
The threat to merchant shipping has broadened. Classical piracy — boarding to steal, to take cargo or to hold crew for ransom — continues in several regions, and it now sits alongside state-linked and non-state attacks using missiles and uncrewed systems, an entirely different category of risk.
| Category | Method | Primary target |
|---|---|---|
| Armed robbery at sea | Boarding at anchor or underway, theft of stores and valuables | Opportunistic |
| Piracy for cargo | Hijack, siphon or transship cargo | Product tankers, smaller vessels |
| Kidnap for ransom | Crew removed and held ashore | Any vessel with reachable crew |
| Hijack for vessel | Seizure of the ship itself | Historically Somalia-pattern |
| Missile and drone attack | Standoff weapons against transiting vessels | Vessels with perceived affiliations |
| Limpet and underwater attack | Devices attached to hulls | Targeted vessels |
| Sabotage of infrastructure | Cables, pipelines, port facilities | Strategic |
The bars show effectiveness against boarding threats; the line shows effectiveness against standoff weapon attack. That divergence is the central point: the measures that protect against pirates do very little against a missile or a drone. Against standoff weapons, only routing avoidance and naval protection meaningfully change the outcome.
Regional patterns
Threat geography changes, and any specific assessment dates quickly. What is stable is the pattern:
- Chokepoints and approaches concentrate risk because vessels slow down and become predictable
- Anchorages are where opportunistic boarding is most common
- Weak coastal governance correlates with sustained piracy activity
- Regional conflict produces standoff-weapon risk regardless of piracy history
For current assessments, use naval coordination centres, industry reporting bodies and your P&I club rather than any static list.
What actually works
Registration and reporting. Registering a transit with the relevant coordination body and reporting position as required is the highest-value measure available, and it is free.
Watchkeeping. Enhanced lookouts, radar vigilance and a briefed bridge team detect approaches early. Almost every successful defence starts with early detection.
Hardening. Razor wire, secured access points, protected accommodation, and locked citadel access. Cheap and effective against boarding.
Citadel. A properly constructed, provisioned, communications-equipped space where the crew can shelter until assistance arrives. It must be genuinely secure and genuinely drilled — a citadel that has never been used in an exercise will fail when it matters.
Speed and manoeuvre. Where the threat is small-craft boarding, higher speed and evasive manoeuvring are effective.
Armed security. Legal in some jurisdictions and not others, requiring flag approval, careful contracting and a clear rules-for-the-use-of-force framework.
Routing. The only measure that reliably addresses standoff-weapon risk, and the reason routing decisions became a central commercial question after 2023.
The crew consequence
Seafarers bear this risk personally, and the industry's record on supporting them is uneven.
| Obligation | Practice |
|---|---|
| Informed notice of high-risk transits | Before the voyage, not on approach |
| Consent and compensation | Per collective agreement and employment terms |
| Training and drills specific to the threat | Not generic security awareness |
| Psychological support during and after | Available, confidential, in the seafarer's language |
| Post-incident care and repatriation | Including for those not physically injured |
| Family communication | Protocols agreed in advance |
The MLC 2025 amendments — key-worker recognition, shore leave, non-discriminatory repatriation and prevention of shipboard violence — reinforce shipowner obligations, with entry into force expected in late December 2027.
Crews who have been attacked, or who have transited under threat repeatedly, carry it afterwards. Support that is offered once and never mentioned again is not support.
Building a security posture
- Threat assessment per voyage, from current sources
- Ship Security Plan reflecting the actual threat, updated as it changes
- Pre-transit briefing for the whole crew, recorded
- Registration with the relevant naval coordination body
- Hardening applied and verified before entry
- Drills covering boarding, citadel entry and loss of communications
- Insurance notified; war risk cover confirmed
- Post-transit debrief captured and shared fleet-wide
- Welfare follow-up after any incident, weeks later as well as immediately
threat geography changes rapidly — consult current naval coordination centre advisories and industry reporting bodies. MLC amendments adopted June 2025, expected in force late December 2027. Effectiveness chart is a conceptual model. Reviewed by the Zeaclub Editorial Team, 24 August 2026.
Frequently asked questions
Is piracy still a problem?
Yes, in several regions and in several forms — armed robbery at anchorages, cargo theft and kidnap for ransom. It has been joined, in some areas, by standoff attacks using missiles and uncrewed systems.
What is BMP?
Best Management Practices — industry guidance on protecting vessels against piracy and maritime security threats, published in regional editions and updated as the threat picture changes.
Do armed guards work?
Against boarding threats they can be effective, subject to flag state approval, coastal state law and a clear use-of-force framework. They offer no protection against standoff weapons.
Can crew refuse to transit a high-risk area?
Rights depend on collective agreements, employment contracts and national law. Many agreements provide for notification, additional compensation and, in some cases, the right to decline. Owners should address this explicitly.