Identify and report the approach early
The bridge should record the aircraft’s first bearing, time, apparent type, markings, altitude, movement and any communications. Visual observation can be supplemented by radar where the system detects the contact, but low-level aircraft tracks may be intermittent.
The team should note:
- whether the helicopter circles, hovers or makes repeated approaches; - lights, insignia and visible weapons; - persons or equipment at an open door; - apparent landing or fast-rope preparation; - VHF channel, call sign and exact instructions; - accompanying ships, boats or aircraft; - changes in GNSS, AIS or communications; and - own-ship verified position, course and speed.
A photograph can help authorities if obtained from protection without distracting navigation. Crew should not gather on exposed decks to film.
The company security officer, flag contact, UKMTO and applicable naval coordination centre should receive an early suspicious-activity report under the ship security plan. The report should state observed facts, not an assumed nationality or intent.
Authenticate communications without provoking delay
The caller may identify a State unit, coalition force or law-enforcement authority. The bridge should use the verification process in flag and company guidance.
A concise response can provide ship identity and ask for the aircraft’s identity, authority, purpose and requested action. The exact exchange should be logged and recorded where lawful and available.
The master should contact the designated naval or flag channel separately to verify the approach. An unverified VHF voice should not be treated automatically as a lawful order.
Authentication may be impossible before the aircraft acts. The master must still make safety decisions using the observed conduct, position, current flag instructions and risk of resistance.
MARAD gives specific instructions to US-flagged ships for some Iranian over-the-horizon diversion hails and separately tells them to answer coalition naval calls. Other flags may issue different directions. The ship must use its applicable guidance rather than copy another vessel’s response.
The crew should never transmit more cargo, route or personnel data than required by law and the approved procedure.
Protect crew from rotor and boarding hazards
Nonessential personnel should move inside to assigned protected locations. Exterior access should be controlled under the ship security plan without trapping anyone needed for safety.
Rotor wash can throw loose objects, damage equipment and injure crew. Deck personnel should not approach the aircraft or descending lines unless trained, equipped and directed under an approved operation.
If armed personnel descend, crew should avoid sudden movements and keep hands visible where doing so improves safety. Language and cultural misunderstandings can escalate rapidly.
The master, ship security officer and essential bridge or engine personnel should maintain communications. Other crew should follow the muster or citadel plan appropriate to the event.
The May Hormuz quick-reference card links boarding with SSAS, the ship security plan and citadel. Citadel use still depends on the master’s judgment, complete crew accountability, navigational safety and the threat. It does not guarantee intervention.
Medical and firefighting readiness should be raised because an aircraft accident, weapons discharge or damaged equipment can create a casualty beyond the security event.
Decide whether to resist, comply or preserve life
A merchant crew is not a military unit. Physical resistance to armed State or State-like personnel can expose seafarers to lethal force and may be ineffective.
The applicable flag guidance and ship security plan should address whether the master declines permission, continues passage, stops or complies when safety is threatened. Shore instructions should arrive before the voyage where possible.
The master should distinguish verbal non-consent from physical resistance. It may be possible to state that the boarding is not consented to, notify the flag and comply under protest to protect life.
If manoeuvring to prevent boarding would create collision, grounding or aircraft danger, the master must consider the greater immediate risk.
No commercial party should instruct the crew to fight, conceal people or destroy documents without lawful authority and a safety assessment. The master’s overriding responsibility is ship and crew safety.
A coerced action should be logged with time, words, conduct and witnesses. Legal characterization can follow.
Manage the ship after personnel board
The master should seek the boarding leader’s identity, authority and purpose where safe. One designated liaison reduces contradictory communication.
The crew should maintain navigation, machinery, fire and cargo safety. Any demand that creates immediate danger should be explained clearly. Inspectors or armed personnel may not understand hazardous-space, tank, electrical or stability limitations.
Access to restricted areas, documents and electronic systems should follow applicable law and the circumstances. The company should receive updates only when communications can be used safely.
Crew welfare and medical needs continue. Personnel should not be separated or questioned without documentation where the master can lawfully and safely maintain oversight, but resistance may be dangerous.
The ship should track all persons embarked, equipment brought aboard, spaces entered, items taken and any damage. Photographs should only be made when safe and permitted.
If the ship is diverted or detained, the master should request destination, reason, authority contact and permission to notify flag, owner and crew families.
Preserve evidence and control public information
VDR, radar, ECDIS, CCTV, VHF logs, satellite messages and crew accounts may later be important. Original files should be preserved and access controlled.
Witnesses should record observations separately. The company should distinguish what the crew saw from what a government or media outlet alleges.
Public statements should avoid declaring a hijacking, seizure or lawful inspection before competent assessment. The operational statement can say that armed personnel boarded, the ship was diverted or contact was lost.
The SUA Convention covers seizure of ships by force as an unlawful act, but applying that characterization requires evidence and legal analysis.
Insurers and charterers should receive prompt factual notice under the relevant terms. War, detention, loss-of-hire, cargo and P&I implications may differ.
ZeaClub can time-stamp communications, flag missing authority details and preserve a controlled boarding log. It cannot authenticate a military unit or determine legal authority by itself.
Commercial conclusion
A military helicopter approach is a high-consequence security and navigation event, but not every approach is an unlawful attack.
The bridge should observe and report early, keep the ship safe, authenticate communications, protect crew and seek flag and authority guidance. If personnel board, the master should minimize escalation while preserving safety, evidence and non-consent where appropriate.
The strongest commercial preparation happens before the aircraft appears: flag-specific instructions, current contacts, a drilled boarding plan and clear recognition that crew lives matter more than proving a legal point in real time.
This article distinguishes verified source material from ZeaClub analysis, recommendations, forecasts and hypothetical scenarios.
Sources
- US Maritime Administration, Advisory 2026-011Accessed 2026-11-19
- International Maritime Organization, SUA treaties and boarding safeguardsAccessed 2026-11-19
- Industry Guidance on the Safe Management of Vessel Transit through the Strait of Hormuz, May 2026Accessed 2026-11-19
- Joint Maritime Information Center, Information Note 128Accessed 2026-11-19
- International Maritime Organization, ISPS Code frequently asked questionsAccessed 2026-11-19