Understand what a citadel is built to do
BMP Maritime Security describes a citadel as a secure location where the crew can retreat if intruders board. It should accommodate everyone, support communications and independent power, provide food, water, sanitation and medical supplies, and be supported by drills and ship-security-plan criteria.
The concept depends on all crew being accounted for inside, communications with company and authorities, and potential intervention by military or law-enforcement forces. It is intended to deny boarders access to people and, where designed, ship control.
That design logic does not necessarily address:
- blast pressure and fragmentation; - fire and smoke from machinery or cargo spaces; - progressive flooding; - structural collapse; - toxic cargo release; - loss of ventilation; - nearby unexploded ordnance; or - escape if the compartment becomes trapped.
A reinforced door can delay an intruder while offering little protection from heat, smoke or hull deformation. A compartment deep in the ship may be protected from fragments but vulnerable to flooding.
The owner should never describe a piracy citadel as missile-rated without competent evidence.
Distinguish shelter, safe muster and citadel use
Shelter means moving nonessential people away from the expected threat and exposed positions. It can involve several locations.
A safe muster point is a protected area where crew not required for navigation or machinery duties assemble during a threat. It needs communications and accountability but may not be designed to resist determined entry.
A citadel is a hardened secure space used under the ship security plan, especially after boarding. Its use normally requires the complete crew to withdraw and secure the space.
During a suspected drone or missile approach, the master may need the bridge team to navigate, engineers to maintain propulsion and damage-control personnel ready. Full citadel withdrawal can make the ship uncontrollable unless remote systems exist.
The response plan should state which personnel go where for each threat. “All crew to citadel” is not adequate if it leaves nobody able to avoid collision or respond to fire.
Map likely consequences against compartment location
A technical review should place the citadel and alternative shelters on the general arrangement and compare them with machinery, fuel, cargo, batteries, ventilation trunks, external shell and escape routes.
For an engine-room strike, a citadel next to machinery casing can face heat, smoke and loss of power. For a deck impact, a low internal space may reduce fragment exposure. For waterline damage, a compartment below or near the damaged side can become unsafe.
The review should consider:
1. structural boundaries and external exposure; 2. fire divisions and smoke migration; 3. ventilation isolation and breathable duration; 4. flooding paths and watertight access; 5. nearby hazardous cargo or fuel; 6. emergency lighting and independent power; 7. two independent escape routes where practicable; 8. communications antenna vulnerability; 9. sanitation and heat load; and 10. access for injured personnel.
A single shelter may be unsuitable for every attack sector. Ships can designate primary and alternate locations based on impact side, fire and flooding.
Naval architects, class, flag and competent fire or security specialists may need to assess modifications. Sandbags or improvised barriers should not obstruct escape, visibility, controls or firefighting.
Keep essential ship-control teams protected but functioning
The bridge and engine room cannot always be emptied while the vessel is underway in Hormuz traffic.
The plan should minimize exposed personnel, position them behind available protection and provide helmets or body protection where the risk assessment supports it. Redundant communications must link command, machinery and sheltered crew.
A relief plan is needed if the threat persists. Keeping the same officers in exposed positions indefinitely creates fatigue and concentrates risk.
If the bridge becomes untenable, the team should know whether an emergency conning position can control steering and propulsion. BMP notes that citadel navigation or engine controls, where fitted, should be used only under planned conditions and for moving away from imminent danger.
If no remote control exists, BMP states that the ship should be stopped before the whole crew enters the citadel, subject to safe navigation. In congested Hormuz waters, stopping may itself be unsafe or impossible.
The master must decide when withdrawal becomes safer than continued control, using the actual traffic and casualty picture.
Prevent fire and ventilation from defeating the shelter
A protected compartment needs more than a lock. Crew must know its ventilation source, isolation controls, air duration, temperature limits and what happens after main power failure.
Smoke can enter through ventilation, cable penetrations or doors opened during a late muster. Fire boundaries and closures must be maintained.
Portable extinguishers support small incipient fires but do not make the occupants a substitute firefighting team. Fixed fire-system controls should be secured so intruders cannot use them against people in a citadel.
During a projectile casualty, damage-control teams may need to remain outside. The plan should identify when they withdraw and how they report conditions without becoming trapped.
Lithium batteries, emergency power supplies and communications equipment inside the shelter introduce their own fire and heat risks. They need approved installation and inspection.
Water, sanitation and medical supplies should reflect heat and expected occupancy, not only the minimum piracy scenario.
Design communications for damaged topside systems
BMP calls for VHF and satellite communications, independent power and satellite antennas independent from bridge systems where possible.
A missile or drone strike may damage exposed antennas simultaneously. The ship should assess antenna separation, protected cable routes, portable equipment and charging.
The sheltered crew needs:
- contact with the master or command team; - company and authority communications; - verified ship position and movement; - fire, flooding and machinery status; - alarm and public-address reception; and - means to report if the main network fails.
A public mobile phone should not be the only backup. Coverage may be absent, monitored or overloaded.
Communications should be tested from the actual closed compartment. A successful check beside an open door proves little.
If the crew uses several shelters, accountability and common instructions become harder. One designated coordinator should maintain the personnel list and relay verified updates.
Plan for boarding and missile threats occurring together
A projectile strike can disable a ship and make boarding easier. A suspicious approach can occur while the crew is managing fire. The plan must address the transition.
If hostile persons board, remaining personnel may need to withdraw to the citadel after securing propulsion and verifying everyone is accounted for. Fire or flooding may make that citadel unusable, requiring an alternate secure muster.
The crew should not lock itself into a compartment threatened by smoke merely because the boarding checklist says “citadel.” The master must retain discretion.
SSAS activation, authority reporting and protected communications should occur under the approved plan. A citadel does not guarantee military response.
The bridge should avoid broadcasting the exact shelter location. Sensitive drawings and procedures require controlled distribution.
Combined drills can test how fire teams, navigation staff and security roles converge without revealing security details unnecessarily.
Keep insurance and chartering claims precise
Owners should disclose material protective arrangements to insurers where policy terms require it, but avoid marketing language such as “missile-proof citadel.”
A compartment assessed for fragment protection is not necessarily certified for direct impact, smoke or flooding. The technical basis and limitations should be documented.
Charterers may request enhanced crew protection for a voyage. The owner must determine whether modifications comply with flag, class, fire safety, escape and stability requirements. A commercial fixture cannot authorize an unsafe conversion.
Capital spending should compare several controls: shelter upgrades, bridge glazing protection, remote communications, fire boundaries, sensor coverage, drills and route deferment. A stronger door may not address the dominant risk.
ZeaClub can link each threat scenario to assigned spaces, personnel, equipment and review dates. It can flag when a casualty makes the primary shelter unavailable. It cannot certify structural or blast protection.
Commercial conclusion
A citadel can be lifesaving during boarding and may provide useful shelter from some external threats. It is not automatically the safest place during a missile or drone attack.
Owners should assess the compartment against blast, fragments, fire, flooding, ventilation, escape and communications. Masters need threat-specific orders that keep essential control teams functioning and move everyone else to suitable protection.
The best plan may use the citadel, another safe muster point or distributed shelters. The decision must follow the ship’s real arrangement and casualty condition, not a generic piracy label.
This article distinguishes verified source material from ZeaClub analysis, recommendations, forecasts and hypothetical scenarios.
Sources
- Industry Guidance on the Safe Management of Vessel Transit through the Strait of Hormuz, May 2026Accessed 2026-11-19
- International Maritime Organization, MSC.1/Circ.1601/Rev.2, BMP Maritime SecurityAccessed 2026-11-19
- International Maritime Organization, piracy and armed-robbery guidanceAccessed 2026-11-19
- US Maritime Administration, Advisory 2026-011Accessed 2026-11-19
- UKMTO, Best Management Practices for Maritime SecurityAccessed 2026-11-19