Rule 13 does not end when the pass begins

COLREG Rule 13 requires an overtaking vessel to keep out of the way of the vessel being overtaken. A vessel is treated as overtaking when coming up from more than 22.5 degrees abaft the other vessel’s beam, such that at night it would see only the sternlight and neither sidelight. If in doubt, it must assume it is overtaking.

The overtaking vessel remains responsible until it is finally past and clear. A later change in bearing does not convert the encounter into a crossing situation or end that duty. This matters when a faster ship draws abeam, encounters small craft or a false AIS target, and tries to return prematurely to its original track.

Rule 10 also applies in an IMO-adopted traffic separation scheme, and the other collision rules remain in force. Proper lookout, safe speed, use of all available means to assess collision risk and early, substantial action are not suspended by a transit slot.

The vessel being overtaken should maintain an effective lookout and comply with its own obligations. It should not make an uncoordinated speed increase because its commercial team dislikes being passed.

Make no-overtaking areas explicit

The passage plan should identify places where overtaking is prohibited by an applicable instruction or rejected by the vessel’s risk assessment. Likely decision factors include lane width, bends, merge points, shallow water, mine warnings, pilot movements, expected small craft and the location of abort points.

The May industry guidance recommends noting no-overtaking and no-crossing cautions where appropriate. That is stronger than telling the master merely to “use caution.” A charted limit gives the bridge team a common trigger and lets shore staff understand why a slower passage may be unavoidable.

An operator must distinguish a company control from an official restriction. If the company declares a no-overtaking sector, the record should say so. It should not attribute that control to a coastal state or naval authority without a verified notice.

Time-bound alternative corridors may have different rules from the internationally recognised traffic separation scheme. The bridge must use the route version and instructions effective for the actual passage. Historical June 2026 corridors, for example, cannot be treated as current November directions.

Test whether the gain is real

Before passing, the team should calculate more than the speed difference. It should estimate the distance and time needed to reach a safe passing position, draw past the target, become finally clear and return to the intended track with adequate margins.

A two-knot advantage can produce a long parallel exposure. During that period the vessel may be unable to respond freely to a small craft approach, mine warning, military hail or developing traffic conflict. The pass may also move it outside an assessed corridor or closer to a territorial, navigational or security limit.

The calculation must use verified motion. The industry guidance reports AIS spoofing and false target injection in the operating environment and says radar and visual observations should be prioritised. AIS speed and closest-point data are supporting information, not sufficient proof that an overtake is safe.

The master should ask what happens if the slower vessel changes course, if a faster vessel approaches from astern, or if the overtake cannot be completed before the next choke point. If the contingency requires an abrupt cut-in, the plan has failed before the manoeuvre begins.

Do not let slot pressure set the speed

A transit window is an input to the passage, not a requirement to violate safe-speed or collision-avoidance duties. The company should define what happens when the ship cannot maintain the expected schedule because of traffic.

The bridge should have authority to slow, abandon the overtake, notify the relevant coordination service and request revised instructions. Commercial staff should avoid messages such as “must clear by 1600” unless the operational meaning and consequences have been verified. A deadline without a safe fallback creates pressure but no navigational solution.

Speed changes also affect machinery readiness and fuel. Repeated acceleration may increase consumption and thermal load. A deeply laden tanker may need much more time and distance to regain or reduce speed than a smaller ship. The passage plan should use vessel-specific manoeuvring information at the actual draft.

If maintaining the required separation would force the ship beyond an approved speed, route or machinery limit, it should remain astern unless an immediate safety situation demands otherwise.

Use VHF carefully

A concise bridge-to-bridge exchange can clarify awareness or an intended pass, but it does not transfer COLREG responsibility or create a private exemption from route instructions. The identity of the other vessel and the meaning of the agreement can be misunderstood, particularly where AIS or position data is unreliable.

The overtaking vessel should still take action that is readily apparent and monitor whether the target responds as expected. Ambiguous exchanges should not replace observation, radar plotting and application of the rules.

Current MARAD guidance for US-flagged ships also warns of anomalous hails and provides specific responses to Iranian communications. That advice applies to its stated vessels and circumstances. Other ships should follow current flag and official instructions. A routine passing call should not become an unnecessary disclosure of sensitive route details.

Communications workload must be assigned. The conning officer should not conduct prolonged commercial or security calls while managing a close pass.

Abort early and predictably

The team should identify abort criteria before altering course. These may include loss of verified position, a target entering the passing space, unacceptable closest point of approach, unexpected movement by the vessel ahead, machinery alarm, a security contact or inability to complete the manoeuvre before a fixed route limit.

Aborting does not mean turning sharply toward the overtaken vessel. The bridge should use the planned safe action for the developing geometry, continue to comply with COLREG and communicate where useful. Engines should be ready for the anticipated speed range.

If the situation becomes an emergency, protecting life and avoiding collision take priority over recovering the original slot. Once stable, the ship should reassess whether to continue, fall back, wait or request new routing.

A report to shore should distinguish a planned overtake that was abandoned from a near miss. If collision risk or another reportable event occurred, applicable company, flag, coastal-state, UKMTO and insurer procedures should be followed.

Record the commercial cause and consequence

The voyage record should preserve the traffic picture, verified position, courses, speeds, closest-point assessments, relevant communications and reasons for the decision. It should also identify any instruction or company control that prohibited the pass.

That evidence helps allocate delay and fuel consequences without asking the bridge to make legal conclusions. Whether time counts, additional cost is recoverable or an order was unsafe depends on the charter wording, governing law and facts.

Owners should price likely speed variability into Gulf employment rather than assume every slow target can be passed. Charterers should provide schedule ranges that recognise traffic sequencing. Insurers benefit when the assured can show that collision controls were not sacrificed to meet a commercial ETA.

ZeaClub can link the approved passage plan, live route version, speed envelope and event log in one controlled voyage record. It can flag a predicted slot miss or a route-version conflict, but it should not recommend an overtake or calculate a misleading “safe to pass” score.

Commercial conclusion

A Hormuz overtake should be exceptional, planned and supported by enough sea room to remain past and clear. The master must retain the ability to reject or abort it when traffic, navigation integrity, security or machinery performance changes.

The apparent gain is often smaller than the exposure. Passing a slower vessel may save minutes while creating a long close-quarters period, extra speed demand and reduced response options. When the evidence is incomplete, remaining astern and seeking a revised movement plan is not poor schedule management. It is preservation of the vessel’s safest remaining option.

This article distinguishes verified source material from ZeaClub analysis, recommendations, forecasts and hypothetical scenarios.

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