A movement time is not right of way

A coordination service may sequence vessels or provide a recommended movement time. That can reduce bunching, but it does not displace COLREG obligations or the master’s responsibility for collision avoidance.

The bridge team should know exactly what the communication means. “Proceed at 1200” may be permission to begin movement, an estimated slot or a reporting instruction. It is not necessarily clearance to cross ahead of established traffic. Any ambiguity should be resolved through an authenticated channel before the ship reaches its final waiting position.

Commercial teams must avoid describing the time as a guaranteed slot unless the issuing authority uses that term and defines its effect. A ship running late should report the revised estimate rather than accelerate into an unsafe gap. A ship running early should not crowd the merge point to preserve queue position.

The master should retain authority to delay entry when traffic, navigation integrity, weather, security or machinery condition makes the planned merge unsafe.

Join early and at a predictable angle

For an IMO-adopted traffic separation scheme, Rule 10 says a vessel should normally join at the lane termination. If joining from the side, it should do so at as small an angle to the general traffic direction as practicable. Areas near scheme terminations require particular caution.

The purpose is predictability. A shallow approach angle allows ships already in the lane to understand the joining vessel’s movement and reduces the abrupt crossing component. It does not eliminate collision risk or give the joining vessel priority.

The passage plan should mark the intended joining point, approach track, target speed, wheel-over positions, abort point and the latest place where the ship can wait without obstructing traffic. It should identify no-crossing and no-overtaking cautions and show how the vessel will become established before a bend or narrowed sector.

An alternative corridor issued for security reasons may have different entry instructions. The master must use the effective route notice, not apply TSS geometry mechanically to a temporary corridor. Historical June evacuation or mine-clearance routes are not current November sailing directions.

Build the traffic picture without trusting AIS alone

The team should identify ships already established in the route, other vessels approaching the same merge, traffic in the opposite direction, small craft and military units. Radar, visual observation and verified position must support the assessment.

The Hormuz industry guidance reports GNSS interference, AIS anomalies and false target injection. A target’s AIS name, destination, speed or vector can therefore be wrong even when a plausible symbol appears on ECDIS. Radar plotting and visual bearings should confirm movement where possible.

A merge calculation should consider the vessel’s acceleration, turning circle, stopping distance and draft. A laden VLCC cannot fill a short gap like a coaster. A gas carrier or container ship may also have operating limits that make rapid speed changes undesirable.

The bridge should test at least three outcomes: joining ahead of the relevant vessel, joining astern, and abandoning the approach. If the third option has no safe track or waiting position, the ship has committed too early.

Define the acceptable gap

A minimum closest point of approach is useful but insufficient. The required gap depends on relative speed, ship size, visibility, traffic on both sides, room to manoeuvre, electronic interference and what happens after joining.

The team should calculate whether the vessel can reach traffic speed without forcing an established ship to slow or alter course. It should also examine the following vessel. Focusing only on the ship ahead can place the joining vessel directly in front of a faster target.

The industry guidance describes an extreme congestion mode using traffic and CPA-instability indicators. Those thresholds are planning aids within that guidance, not a universal declaration that every situation below them is safe. A single poorly positioned ship can close a merge even when the total target count is low.

When a safe gap does not exist, the correct response may be another circuit in an authorised area, reduced approach speed, a return to the waiting plan or a new sequence from the competent authority. The choice must be charted and assessed. Improvised loitering beside the entry can be more dangerous than missing the movement time.

Apply crossing and overtaking duties correctly

A vessel approaching across a lane may initially be in a crossing situation, while one approaching from astern may be overtaking. Once established, the encounter can evolve. The bridge should identify the applicable rules from actual geometry and visibility rather than label every interaction a “merge.”

Rule 10 does not relieve vessels of other COLREG duties. The give-way vessel should take early and substantial action, and a stand-on vessel must continue monitoring whether effective action is being taken. No ship should rely on another vessel’s presumed queue number.

VHF can clarify awareness, but an informal agreement does not erase legal duties. Misidentification is possible, especially with unreliable AIS. Calls should use verified descriptors and concise closed-loop language. The manoeuvre must remain apparent through the ship’s action.

If a vessel already in the route makes an unexpected alteration or speed change, the joining ship should use its pre-planned abort option rather than force the original timing.

Keep security controls during the merge

The merge creates high workload at the same time that small-craft surveillance, military communications and route authentication may be most important. Roles must be separated.

The conning officer should manage the ship. A radar plotter should maintain the traffic solution. Lookouts should cover assigned sectors. Another qualified person may handle routine reporting and record messages. The same officer should not negotiate a slot, answer an insurer and monitor multiple unstable CPAs.

Speed should remain safe for the navigation situation and consistent with the vessel’s assessed security posture. “Maximum safe manoeuvring speed” is not automatically maximum engine speed. It is the speed that preserves effective control, stopping options and compliance with the route plan under the prevailing conditions.

A security contact does not justify an unverified course change into traffic. If immediate danger requires action, the master must protect life and avoid collision, then notify the appropriate authorities and reassess the route.

Document sequence, delay and responsibility

The ship’s record should preserve the source and wording of movement instructions, acknowledgement time, estimated and actual arrival at the merge, verified traffic picture, courses and speeds, closest-point assessments and reasons for delay or abort.

Reports should distinguish facts from interpretations. “Vessel B altered five degrees to starboard at 1214 UTC” is an observation. “Vessel B tried to steal our slot” is an allegation unless supported by stronger evidence.

This record supports later charter and insurance analysis. A delay caused by traffic deconfliction is not automatically the same as delay caused by a closed route, vessel defect or security suspension. Allocation of time and cost depends on the contract and facts.

ZeaClub can maintain a shared movement record linking route version, official messages, ship estimates, port-agent updates and abort decisions. It can highlight conflicting times and stale instructions, but it should not assign COLREG priority or issue traffic clearance.

Commercial conclusion

A safe Hormuz merge is created by early geometry, verified traffic information, a realistic gap and a usable abort option. An authority’s sequence helps organise demand, but it cannot manufacture sea room or transfer the master’s collision-avoidance duties.

Owners should plan for missed entry times and fuel consumed while waiting. Charterers should avoid instructions that equate punctuality with priority. Brokers and traders should model a transit range rather than a single timestamp when ships are released in groups.

The decisive test is not whether the vessel can reach the entry point on schedule. It is whether it can join without forcing another ship to compensate, retain control if the gap closes and remain on a verified route after the merge. When that evidence is absent, delaying entry is the safer commercial decision.

This article distinguishes verified source material from ZeaClub analysis, recommendations, forecasts and hypothetical scenarios.

Sources