Compare predictability with manoeuvring freedom
A stationary ship presents a more predictable position to observers and potential attackers. It may also have less immediate speed for evasive action. The industry guidance identifies threats from missiles, drones, uncrewed surface craft, boarding and sabotage, while noting that remaining underway can make targeting and boarding more difficult where safe.
That does not mean movement is always safer. A drifting vessel can set toward traffic routes, shallow water, offshore installations or another waiting ship. A powered loitering pattern can create repeated encounters and make course intentions unclear. Dense manoeuvring near an approach may increase collision risk more than a well-managed anchorage.
The assessment should identify what mobility actually buys. If the vessel needs substantial time to start the main engine, recover the anchor or reach an effective manoeuvring speed, the response assumption must use that delay. "Engines ready" should have a defined condition, test and watch arrangement.
Distance from port infrastructure creates another trade-off. The May guidance notes that areas closer to port may have higher traffic and proximity to refineries or terminals, but potentially better protected infrastructure and faster evacuation or rescue access. Offshore areas may reduce congestion while lengthening response. These are conditional factors, not promises of protection.
The company security officer, master and ship security officer should coordinate with relevant military and local authorities as appropriate. A commercial desk should not select a waiting coordinate from an old voyage solely because it lowers deviation.
Test whether anchoring is technically viable
Before choosing anchoring, the passage plan should verify permission, charted depth, under-keel clearance, seabed and holding characteristics, swing circle, nearby hazards, traffic, weather, tide and the ability to leave. A labelled anchorage on a chart is not evidence that space is currently available or that the position is suitable for a particular draft.
The team should calculate the swing area for the intended cable and forecast conditions, including other ships' possible swings. GNSS interference can corrupt anchor-watch alarms, so visual bearings, radar ranges, echo-sounder trends and other independent checks may be needed.
STCW watchkeeping guidance says that, where the master considers it necessary, a continuous navigational watch should be maintained at anchor. It includes plotting the ship's position, checking that the anchor is holding, maintaining lookout, observing weather and tide, notifying the master if the ship drags, and keeping machinery at the ordered readiness. Conflict conditions make those disciplines more important, not less.
Anchor recovery is part of the escape plan. The crew needs a realistic time to weigh anchor, accounting for windlass condition, cable load, deck exposure and the possibility of fouling. If a small-craft, drone or missile threat requires immediate movement, personnel may not be able to remain safely on the forecastle. The security plan should not depend on an anchor operation that exposes crew during an attack.
Dragging risk must be treated as dynamic. The IMO's e-navigation service examples include a vessel warned after high winds cause it to drag anchor. Weather deterioration, current change or another vessel's movement can invalidate the original position. The ship needs alarm thresholds, engine readiness and a relocation plan before that happens.
Put a time limit on the waiting mode
The best initial choice can become the wrong choice as the delay extends. Fuel falls, weather changes, traffic accumulates, crew fatigue grows, the anchor position becomes crowded, or the expected window moves. The approval should therefore state when the mode will be reviewed and which events trigger immediate reassessment.
Triggers can include a new security warning, loss of communications, GNSS degradation, unexpected small-craft activity, dragging, drift outside limits, machinery alarm, worsening visibility, change in naval coordination, insufficient crew rest or a fuel threshold. If a window is cancelled, the ship should not remain indefinitely under assumptions designed for a short wait.
MARAD's active advisory describes high attack and navigation risks and calls for pre-voyage assessment, protective measures and monitoring of VHF Channel 16. Applicable reporting centres and authorities should receive required updates when the ship's position, ETA or operational plan changes.
The master also needs authority to leave a waiting position without seeking a lengthy commercial approval when immediate safety requires it. Shore teams can manage counterparties and costs after the initial action. A waiting-mode procedure that traps the master in an approval chain defeats its safety purpose.
Record who bears the commercial consequences
Anchoring, drifting and remaining underway produce different costs. Fuel consumption, engine hours, anchor wear, crew overtime, deviation, port charges, security measures and insurance exposure may vary. Waiting time can affect hire, laytime, demurrage, due despatch and cargo schedules.
The event record should identify why the mode was chosen, who issued relevant orders, what official information was used, when the choice was reviewed and why it changed. Legal allocation depends on the contract and facts, so the operational team should preserve those facts rather than label time automatically as owners' or charterers' account.
A Zeaclub waiting-mode board can compare candidate positions and modes across security exposure, traffic, navigation, weather, holding ground, rescue access, fuel, machinery, crew workload and time to move. It can time-stamp authority confirmations and alert the team when a boundary or review deadline approaches.
The platform should not advertise a "safe anchorage" or recommend a position autonomously. Its value is to expose assumptions and maintain one versioned decision record. Location data should be restricted to authorised users because unnecessary distribution can itself increase security risk.
The practical conclusion is that waiting is an active phase of the voyage. Anchoring can improve positional control, drifting can preserve some flexibility, and powered movement can improve responsiveness. The right choice is the one that retains the safest credible exit while balancing current security and navigational risks, then changes when the evidence changes.
This article distinguishes verified source material from ZeaClub analysis, recommendations, forecasts and hypothetical scenarios.
Sources
- UKMTO and industry partners, "Industry Guidance on the Safe Management of Vessel Transit through the Strait of Hormuz," May 2026:Accessed 2026-11-19
- U.S. Maritime Administration, "2026-011 Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman: Iranian Attacks on Commercial Vessels," current advisory accessed 18 November 2026:Accessed 2026-11-19
- International Maritime Organization, "Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea," accessed 18 November 2026:Accessed 2026-11-19
- International Maritime Organization, STCW watchkeeping provisions for ships at anchor:Accessed 2026-11-19
- International Maritime Organization, MSC.1/Circ.1610, maritime-service examples for anchoring assistance and anchor-drag warnings:Accessed 2026-11-19