Build the small-target picture early
Small craft may have weak radar returns, intermittent AIS or no AIS transmission. Sea clutter, land background, fishing gear and high closing speeds can reduce detection time. A dedicated visual lookout and properly tuned radars are essential.
The bridge team should use more than one radar scale and avoid settings that suppress small returns. Visual bearings, relative movement, electronic plotting where reliable and repeated observations can help establish whether a craft is crossing normally, fishing, shadowing or closing.
AIS is not a complete traffic picture. A craft without an AIS symbol is not automatically suspicious, and an AIS identity is not proof that the transmitting craft matches it. The team should compare position, course, appearance and behaviour.
The May 2026 industry guidance calls for a master or chief officer on the bridge, an additional officer where practicable, a dedicated lookout or radar plotter and clear cross-checking during transit. These measures matter because one officer cannot simultaneously con the ship, monitor military hails, evaluate small targets and manage company messages.
Contacts should be numbered or otherwise tracked consistently. A craft disappearing in clutter and reappearing should not be treated as a new target without checking its movement history.
Communicate without surrendering control
The ship should maintain the required VHF watch and use concise, neutral language. If a craft creates collision concern, the bridge can state the ship's identity, position, course, speed and intended safe passing action without disclosing unnecessary cargo or route details.
A caller claiming authority should be authenticated through current flag, naval or coastal procedures where circumstances permit. The ship should not change course or stop solely because an unidentified voice names the vessel.
MARAD provides specific instructions for U.S.-flagged ships receiving certain over-the-horizon Iranian calls or emails. Other flags may have different directions. The bridge pack should contain the applicable flag guidance, not a generic rule copied from another registry.
Language difficulty and radio congestion can cause misunderstanding. Closed-loop phrasing, repetition of the requested action and logging of the exact exchange help. Argumentative or threatening broadcasts can escalate the encounter and distract from navigation.
The company security officer can contact UKMTO or naval liaison while the bridge maintains the live picture. If time is short, the master should use the emergency or incident-reporting channel directly.
Escalate according to observed behaviour
The passage plan can define levels. A contact in normal traffic receives navigation monitoring. A craft with uncertain or unusual behaviour triggers enhanced tracking and a security-team readiness check. A persistent close approach prompts official reporting and protective measures. Weapons, attempted boarding or an apparent attack activate the ship security and emergency response.
These levels must align with the approved ship security plan, flag direction and current threat assessment. They are not a substitute for the master's judgment.
The crew should avoid crowding exposed decks to watch or film. Non-essential personnel can move to designated protected locations as the threat escalates. Access points, fire equipment, medical response and communications should be prepared under the vessel's plan.
UKMTO asks mariners to report suspicious activity, and its after-action form seeks specific observations such as craft type, colour, markings, personnel, weapons, approach, communications and defensive actions. Collecting these details should never put crew at extra risk.
An apparent approach that ends without incident should still be reported when it meets current criteria. Timely factual reports can help authorities warn following ships. Social-media posting should wait for company review and must not expose live position or unverified attribution.
Preserve evidence and commercial continuity
After the contact clears, the bridge should verify route position, surrounding traffic, machinery and crew condition. A high-speed or evasive manoeuvre may have changed fuel use, ETA or under-keel clearance assumptions.
The operational record should include UTC times, independently checked positions, radar plots or screenshots under approved procedures, VHF log, visual descriptions, actions and reports. VDR data may need preservation. Facts added later should be marked as later information.
Owners should notify insurers and charterers according to policy and contract requirements. Commercial updates can state that a suspicious approach occurred, whether the vessel is safe and the revised ETA. Sensitive tactical detail should remain restricted.
A Zeaclub small-craft tracker can hold numbered contacts, behaviour indicators, closest approach, evidence confidence and reporting status. It should not use an algorithm to label a fishing vessel hostile from speed or AIS absence alone. Human verification and the master's authority remain central.
The commercial impact includes speed change, delay, fuel, crew stress, possible inspection and claims. Those costs are real even when no attack occurs, but they should not be inflated by unsupported conclusions.
Safe Hormuz navigation depends on avoiding two errors: dismissing a dangerous approach as ordinary traffic, and turning ordinary traffic into an enemy through assumption. Early detection, observable thresholds, controlled communications and safe manoeuvring give the bridge a defensible path between them.
This article distinguishes verified source material from ZeaClub analysis, recommendations, forecasts and hypothetical scenarios.
Sources
- Joint Maritime Information Center, "Information Note 128: Suspicious Approach / Electronic Interference," 5 February 2026:Accessed 2026-11-19
- Joint industry organisations, "Industry Guidance on the Safe Management of Vessel Transit through the Strait of Hormuz," May 2026:Accessed 2026-11-19
- U.S. Maritime Administration, "2026-011 Persian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz and Gulf of Oman: Iranian Attacks on Commercial Vessels," active advisory accessed 18 November 2026:Accessed 2026-11-19
- International Maritime Organization, "COLREG: Preventing Collisions at Sea," accessed 18 November 2026:Accessed 2026-11-19
- United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations, "After Action Report" format, accessed 18 November 2026:Accessed 2026-11-19
- United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations, operations centre and recent incidents, accessed 18 November 2026:Accessed 2026-11-19