Vessel Size Changes the Consequence
A strike that causes localized damage on a large ship may overwhelm a tug or dhow. Smaller craft can have less reserve buoyancy, shorter damage-stability margins, fewer watertight subdivisions, and machinery concentrated in a compact space.
Low freeboard can increase flooding after a waterline breach. A small engine room may lose propulsion, steering, power, firefighting, and communications from one impact.
Risk assessments should examine consequence by vessel type rather than assigning every transit the same security rating. The probability of encountering a threat may be similar in one area, while survivability differs materially.
Crew Size Limits Emergency Capacity
A dhow or tug may operate with a small crew. If one person is injured, the loss can remove a large share of navigation, engineering, firefighting, or medical capacity.
The crew may need to fight fire, control flooding, navigate, communicate, care for casualties, and prepare abandonment at the same time. There may be no spare watch or dedicated medical officer.
Drills should be realistic for the actual number and competence onboard. A plan that assumes several independent emergency teams may be impossible on a small craft.
Dhows Can Be Underrepresented in Digital Awareness
Traditional trading dhows may have different equipment, reporting practices, language capability, and shore support from large internationally managed ships. Some may not appear consistently in commercial tracking datasets or corporate intelligence feeds.
That creates a visibility problem. An incident may be reported later, vessel identity may initially be unknown, and rescue coordination may rely on nearby ships or regional authorities.
Maritime security centers and larger operators should not treat absence from a familiar fleet database as absence from the sea. Bridge teams need visual, radar, and VHF awareness of local traffic, especially when GNSS and AIS are unreliable.
Tugs Are Drawn Toward the Hazard
Tugs may be asked to assist a disabled, burning, grounded, or drifting ship. Their work can place them close to a recent attack location and stationary or slow alongside a casualty.
JMIC warned in March of credible follow-on strike risk near affected vessels and highlighted exposure for ships supporting or assisting a recently hit ship. The reported strike on MUSSAFAH 2 while supporting SAFEEN PRESTIGE illustrates the operational concern.
Assistance remains essential, but it requires a security plan: threat update, command and communications, approach route, time alongside, emergency separation, medical support, and conditions for withdrawal.
Port and Offshore Operations Depend on Small Craft
Pilots, line boats, crew boats, bunker barges, supply vessels, dredgers, and service craft keep Gulf ports and offshore installations functioning. If these operators suspend work, a terminal may be physically intact yet unable to berth or service ships.
A conflict assessment should therefore track small-craft availability as port infrastructure. Losing tug capacity can reduce berth size, weather limits, emergency towage, or fire response. Losing pilot boats can stop movements entirely.
Terminal resilience plans need mutual-aid arrangements, spare capacity, protected bases, and safe crewing, not only reinforced shore assets.
Small Craft May Lack Global Shore Support
A major owner can maintain a 24-hour security desk, subscribe to intelligence, contact insurers, and coordinate governments. A local dhow or tug operator may have a smaller office and fewer specialist resources.
Ports, charterers, agents, and authorities can reduce the gap by distributing verified advisories in usable languages, maintaining simple reporting routes, and including local craft in drills and traffic plans.
This is not charity. Deep-sea shipping relies on these operators. Their information and resilience are part of the port's safety system.
Insurance and Contract Structures Differ
A tug assisting a casualty may operate under a towage, salvage, port-service, or emergency arrangement. A dhow may carry cargo under documentation and insurance practices different from a liner or tanker.
War-risk cover, crew cover, liability, hull value, salvage reward, and contractual indemnities need vessel-specific review. An urgent request to assist should not conceal who bears the extraordinary war exposure.
Commercial parties should establish emergency terms and authority before the crisis where possible. Negotiation should not delay life-saving action, but uncertainty can be reduced through standing arrangements.
Rescue Planning Must Consider Rapid Loss
The JMIC report on SELAT STORM said casualty reports were conflicting and the tug was reported sunk. The AL JUSUFI incident required rescue of surviving crew.
Small-craft plans should assume the vessel may become uninhabitable quickly. Life-saving appliances, immersion protection where relevant, portable communications, location beacons, medical kits, and abandonment drills deserve particular attention.
Nearby merchant ships may receive a Mayday or observe survivors. Their masters must balance the duty and ability to assist with the possibility of follow-on attack. Company guidance should support rapid security coordination rather than leave the bridge alone with that conflict.
Communications Need Redundancy and Simplicity
Small vessels may rely heavily on VHF and mobile or limited satellite services. Interference, equipment damage, or power loss can isolate them.
Emergency plans should use short standard messages, known reporting contacts, backup power, portable equipment, and agreed check-in intervals. Shore staff should know when a missed check-in becomes an emergency.
Language and terminology matter. A crew should be able to describe position, damage, people onboard, injuries, flooding, fire, and assistance needed without a complex form.
A Small-Craft Risk Checklist
Before high-risk operations, operators should verify:
- hull and machinery readiness; - watertight integrity and dewatering; - firefighting capacity for crew size; - lifesaving equipment and portable communications; - accurate identity and voyage documents; - current route and threat information; - reporting and check-in plan; - safe distance from military and recent incident areas; - assistance and withdrawal criteria; - insurer and charterer approvals; - crew rest, briefing, and emergency roles.
The checklist should fit the vessel. Copying a tanker security manual onto a tug does not create capability.
A Hypothetical Rescue Tug
Assume a tanker loses propulsion after an attack near Musandam. A harbor tug is asked to assist. The tug has sufficient bollard pull but limited firefighting and no armored protection.
The operator obtains the latest threat assessment, coordinates with authorities and the casualty, plans the shortest safe exposure, confirms emergency release, prepares medical and abandonment equipment, and establishes continuous shore monitoring. A second tug remains available outside the immediate area if feasible.
If hostile activity continues or communication cannot be authenticated, the approach may be delayed or changed. The decision balances the casualty's urgent need against creating another casualty.
Market Analysis Should Count the Supporting Fleet
Freight models often count available tankers while assuming tugs, pilots, bunker craft, and service vessels remain available. A conflict can invalidate that assumption.
The effective capacity of a port may fall before berth damage appears. Waiting times rise, ships consume more fuel, and safe weather windows narrow. The resulting cost can spread across cargoes that were never directly attacked.
Traders and charterers should ask not only whether the terminal is open, but whether its marine-service ecosystem is functioning.
Verification Standards Must Include Local Craft
IMO says its regional incident list uses flag states, coastal states, and credible verified third parties. JMIC and UKMTO updates have helped identify craft initially reported without full details.
Companies should avoid filling gaps with speculation about a dhow's cargo, ownership, or intent. Local craft deserve the same distinction between verified fact, allegation, and assessment as internationally prominent ships.
Late or incomplete information is a reason for cautious analysis, not a license for a convenient narrative.
The ZeaClub View
Tugs, dhows, and service craft are both exposed mariners and critical infrastructure. Their smaller size can magnify physical damage, while their work can draw them toward disabled ships, ports, and offshore assets.
A Gulf plan focused only on large tankers misses rescue capacity, port continuity, local trade, and people whose vessels may have the least redundancy.
The appropriate response is vessel-specific preparedness, inclusive reporting, fair allocation of war risk, and recognition that the smallest working craft can determine whether the largest ship moves safely.
This article distinguishes verified source material from ZeaClub analysis, recommendations, forecasts and hypothetical scenarios.
Sources
- JMIC Advisory Update 111, 5 November 2026Accessed 2026-11-19
- JMIC Advisory Update 113, 12 November 2026Accessed 2026-11-19
- JMIC Advisory Update 032, 14 April 2026Accessed 2026-11-19
- IMO, Highlighted confirmed Middle East incidentsAccessed 2026-11-19
- IMO, Middle East information and validation methodologyAccessed 2026-11-19