Start with SOLAS bridge procedures

SOLAS chapter V regulation 24 governs the use of heading and track control systems. Flag implementation and company procedures should ensure that manual control can be established immediately in areas of high traffic density, restricted visibility and other hazardous navigation situations.

A qualified helmsman must be available, and the changeover should occur under the supervision of a responsible officer. Manual steering should be tested after prolonged use of automatic control. Operators must apply the exact requirements and flag guidance applicable to their vessel.

Regulation 25 addresses operation of steering gear. In areas where navigation demands special caution, more than one steering-gear power unit should be operating when the units can run simultaneously. Regulation 26 covers tests, drills, operating instructions and records.

These obligations are broader than the Hormuz security problem. A company cannot substitute a war-risk checklist for statutory steering procedures, and an insurer’s approval does not certify the steering mode.

Divide the passage into steering phases

The passage plan should state the intended mode at the approach, waiting area, route entry, constrained sectors, open reaches, merge points and exit. It should also identify triggers for switching.

Manual steering may be appropriate where:

- traffic density or CPA instability is high; - frequent or immediate course changes may be required; - a pilot or authority route has tight geometry; - GNSS, gyro, heading or track-control inputs are suspect; - small craft or military units create unpredictable encounters; - visibility or weather reduces response margins; or - the master considers automatic control unsuitable.

Heading control may remain appropriate in a stable reach when sensor inputs are verified, course changes are limited and the bridge is actively monitoring performance. Track control demands particular care because it may depend on GNSS-derived position and route data.

The plan should not schedule changeover at the busiest point. The bridge should select a stable sector with sea room, call the helmsman early and confirm the new mode before commitment.

Understand what degraded navigation does to automation

Current MARAD guidance reports significant GNSS interference, spoofing and jamming in the Persian Gulf, Strait and Gulf of Oman. The industry guidance also reports AIS anomalies and false target injection.

Autopilot using a reliable heading reference is not identical to track control following a GNSS-defined line. A bridge team must know which sensors, filters and control mode are active. A heading-control system may continue to steer the ordered heading during GNSS loss, while track control may respond to a false cross-track error if its position input is corrupted.

Gyro or speed-log error can also affect integrated systems. Radar overlays and ECDIS own-ship display may become misleading even if the rudder follows the commanded heading correctly.

On detecting suspected spoofing, the industry guidance advises recording the last valid position, establishing position through independent means, shifting to dead reckoning or estimated position and avoiding unnecessary course alterations until position is confirmed. It says to steer with heading control or manually. The operational choice depends on which inputs remain trustworthy.

The bridge should never switch to manual steering merely to feel less automated while continuing to steer toward an unverified electronic waypoint.

Make the handover explicit

A change of steering mode should be a controlled bridge event. The officer should state the ordered heading, current mode, gyro or compass reference, rudder status and any limits. The helmsman should repeat the order and demonstrate control.

The team should verify:

1. the correct steering position has control; 2. the rudder responds in the intended direction; 3. heading is stable and independently checked; 4. alarms and off-course limits are understood; 5. non-follow-up or emergency controls are available under the vessel’s procedures; and 6. the engine room and master know of any defect.

The change should be recorded when required by company or flag procedures. A mode indication on one display should be cross-checked with the actual control status.

Returning to automatic control deserves equal care. The bridge should not hand control back while the ship is still recovering from an avoiding action, before sensor integrity is restored or without confirming that the programmed track matches the current approved route.

Protect the helmsman from fatigue and overload

Manual steering is only as reliable as the person executing orders. Long periods at the wheel can reduce concentration, particularly after an extended security wait or during night transit.

The plan should specify relief intervals based on conditions, company procedures and the individual’s fitness. A qualified relief should be briefed and ready before performance declines. The handover should occur in a stable situation and include the steering reference, recent orders and any unusual response.

The helmsman should not also serve as lookout. The industry guidance expressly separates those functions. Nor should the helmsman answer VHF, monitor social media alerts or interpret route messages.

The conning officer must use clear, closed-loop commands and monitor execution. Ambiguous phrases such as “follow the track” are unacceptable where the track itself may be suspect. Orders should use the verified heading or rudder instruction appropriate to the situation.

If the ship lacks enough rested, qualified personnel to sustain the planned enhanced bridge team, the company should reconsider timing or transit rather than conceal the shortage.

Prepare for steering failure, not just mode failure

Losing autopilot is inconvenient; losing steering control can be catastrophic in a narrow or congested route. Pre-transit tests and drills should cover the actual steering system, communications and emergency arrangements.

The bridge and engine room should know how to recognise a failure of heading input, control transfer, hydraulic power, follow-up control or rudder indication. They should distinguish a false display from a physical rudder fault.

The emergency steering drill should establish communications between bridge and steering-gear compartment, local control procedures and the limitations of the emergency arrangement. Crew should know who takes command, who reports to authorities and who prepares anchors or propulsion changes under the ship’s plans.

A second power unit, where required and technically possible, reduces some failure exposure but may introduce manufacturer-specific operating limits. The chief engineer and master should follow approved instructions rather than assume “two is always better.”

Tugs or salvage support may not be immediately available. The Hormuz industry guidance warns that limited resources can delay removal of a disabled ship. That increases the value of early fault detection and a rehearsed response.

Keep a monitoring loop in either mode

Automation does not relieve the officer of the watch from monitoring heading, rudder, cross-track error, traffic and independent position. Manual control does not guarantee that the ordered course is safe.

The bridge should compare intended and actual movement using radar, visual bearings, parallel indexes, echo sounder and dead reckoning as appropriate. Deviations need a cause: current, helmsman error, sensor fault, steering lag or a wrong route.

Alarm thresholds should support detection without generating constant nuisance alerts. Repeated alarms can mask a genuine failure and raise workload. Any temporary suppression should follow approved procedures and be restored when the condition ends.

The master should define which changes require immediate call, including unexpected yaw, excessive rudder, control-mode disagreement, loss of a heading source, unstable position inputs or inability to maintain the route.

ZeaClub can preserve the approved steering-mode plan, test record, defect status, watch allocation and changeover times. It can highlight an expired steering test or personnel gap, but it should not select the steering mode or send helm commands.

Commercial conclusion

Manual steering is often a strong control during the most demanding parts of a Hormuz transit, but continuous manual operation is not automatically safer. It must be supported by rested helmsmen, clear orders, active monitoring and a planned relief system.

Owners should budget the personnel and preparation needed for enhanced bridge operations. Charterers should not impose timing that encourages an unplanned return to automation or rushed mode transfer. Insurers need evidence that statutory tests, defects and risk controls were properly managed.

The defensible approach is phase-based: verify the sensors, choose the mode that preserves immediate and predictable control, test every handover and switch before conditions remove the margin to do so safely.

This article distinguishes verified source material from ZeaClub analysis, recommendations, forecasts and hypothetical scenarios.

Sources