Build one timeline with two decision gates

The passage plan should show the Hormuz security window, the port approach, the pilot boarding area and the latest safe time to slow, wait, abort or divert. It should not assume that the Strait ETA automatically becomes the pilot ETA.

The first gate asks whether the ship may safely commit to the selected Hormuz route under current official guidance, company criteria and the master’s judgment. The second asks whether pilot transfer conditions and port readiness remain acceptable when the ship reaches the approach. Either gate can close independently.

IMO resolution A.960(23) recommends that the competent authority establish a safe boarding point far enough from the start of pilotage for safe transfer and sufficient time and sea room for the master-pilot information exchange. It also calls for ships to provide ETA or departure information early and update it frequently because pilotage resources must be planned in advance.

In a volatile transit, a single ETA is too brittle. The agent should receive a base time and a realistic range, followed by updates at agreed decision points. Messages must distinguish a navigational estimate from a confirmed security movement. Commercial pressure to preserve the pilot slot should never cause the ship to accelerate, cross an abort point or accept a route that the master considers unsafe.

Verify the boarding service, not just the booking

A pilot order should identify the provider, boarding position, VHF channel, reporting point, pilot boat, required speed or lee and cancellation process. Material changes should be authenticated through established contacts.

The master should ask whether the boarding area has been shifted because of security activity, congestion, weather or a navigational warning. If coordinates arrive through an unfamiliar email, chat account or unsolicited VHF call, the bridge team should not act until the instruction is independently verified. Current MARAD advice for US-flagged ships highlights anomalous communications and requires close coordination with NAVCENT NCAGS; ships under other flags must follow their own applicable official guidance.

Port readiness also requires evidence. Tug, berth, terminal, mooring and traffic-control status may determine whether the ship can continue after boarding. The plan should address berth unavailability and anchorage congestion.

A booking that cannot answer those questions is a commercial expectation, not an operational clearance.

Protect the transfer from transit fatigue

Hormuz preparations can keep bridge and engine personnel at heightened readiness for hours. A delayed boarding may extend that workload just when precise shiphandling and close communication are needed.

The company should ensure the bridge and pilot-ladder teams are fit for the transfer and ensuing pilotage. Relief should occur before the critical approach. Unsafe fatigue requires delay or another safe arrangement.

The pilot ladder and associated equipment should be inspected, rigged and supervised under the rules currently applicable to the ship. IMO adopted revised SOLAS regulation V/23 requirements and performance standards in 2025, but they are expected to enter into force on 1 January 2028. Operators must not describe those future requirements as already mandatory in November 2026, although voluntary early implementation and the revised IMO illustrations may improve preparation.

MSC.576(110) states that safe transfer is a shared responsibility involving the shipowner, operator, master, crew, pilotage provider, pilot, pilot-boat crew and the person being transferred. That allocation is commercially important. Ordering a pilot does not transfer the owner’s responsibility for a compliant arrangement or the master’s responsibility for the ship.

Keep navigation stable during boarding

The transfer plan should specify the intended course and speed, safe sea room, traffic limitations, propulsion configuration and conditions that require postponement. It should consider swell, wind, visibility, wake, traffic density and the vessel’s freeboard and manoeuvring characteristics.

The bridge team must continue collision avoidance and position verification while supporting the transfer. The May Hormuz guidance recommends radar and visual observations, manual cross-checks and preparation for degraded GNSS and AIS. A boarding operation should not depend on one electronic position source or an AIS vector from the pilot boat.

Tasks must be divided. The embarkation supervisor needs reliable bridge communication and authority to stop an unsafe transfer.

Security lookouts should remain effective, but security measures must not obstruct the pilot’s access, trap the transfer team or prevent emergency recovery. Lighting, access controls and personal protective equipment should be agreed before arrival.

If suspicious activity develops, the bridge should apply the ship security plan and current official reporting procedures. A nearby small craft should not be labelled hostile without evidence, but neither should the pilot boat be assumed authentic merely because it approaches the boarding side.

Plan for a missed or aborted transfer

A missed pilot slot is not permission to improvise. The passage plan should identify a safe course, speed and location after an aborted approach, including depth, traffic, security exposure and proximity to charted hazards. “Stand by nearby” is inadequate where congestion, mines, electronic interference or military activity may be present.

The master and port should agree the communications sequence if:

- the pilot boat is late or cannot approach; - the boarding position changes; - weather or visibility exceeds agreed limits; - propulsion, steering or communications degrade; - the transfer equipment is found defective; - the pilot refuses the arrangement; - the security picture changes; or - the berth or tug plan is withdrawn.

The response may be a designated waiting area, remaining underway, returning to sea or another authorised arrangement. It requires chart, clearance and risk assessment.

Contracting teams should decide in advance how delay, deviation, bunkers and additional port costs will be recorded. The legal result depends on the charter party and facts. The operational log should therefore separate the cause of the delay: security transit restriction, unsafe transfer conditions, pilot unavailability, port congestion or vessel deficiency. Blending them into “port delay” weakens later claims analysis.

Conduct a real master-pilot exchange

Pilot boarding is not the end of voyage planning. Before pilotage begins, the master and pilot need time to exchange information, confirm roles and reconcile the port plan with the ship’s condition.

The exchange should cover draft, manoeuvring data, propulsion and steering status, tug plan, berth, under-keel clearance, traffic, local warnings, communications and abort actions. In the current Gulf context, it should also identify any GNSS or AIS anomalies, relevant security reports and the navigation methods being used to verify position.

The pilot brings local knowledge but does not displace the master. IMO guidance says the master, bridge officers and pilot share responsibility for good communication and understanding, while bridge officers must support and monitor the pilot. If the pilot’s intended route conflicts with verified security guidance or the approved passage plan, the conflict should be resolved before the vessel reaches a point where options disappear.

Language should be closed-loop and specific. “Keep clear of the area” is weaker than an identified limit, course or reporting point. An unverified security allegation should be labelled as such and reported through the proper channel rather than converted into a navigation order.

Commercial conclusion

A well-coordinated arrival preserves three forms of optionality: the ship can delay the Strait commitment, abort an unsafe transfer and decline a port movement that no longer matches the verified plan. Losing any one of those options can expose the vessel to avoidable waiting, fatigue, fuel consumption and contractual dispute.

Owners should require a single, version-controlled arrival record linking the transit assessment, ETA range, pilot order, boarding coordinates, port readiness, equipment check, fatigue plan and abort action. ZeaClub can host that shared record and timestamp updates from the vessel, agent and operations desk. It should flag conflicting coordinates or expired confirmations without pretending to authenticate an authority or decide whether a transfer is safe.

The decisive principle is simple: coordinate the two operations, but do not collapse them into one approval. The Hormuz transit must remain safe on its own evidence. The pilot transfer must remain safe on its own conditions. Only when both gates are open should a commercial schedule become a vessel movement.

This article distinguishes verified source material from ZeaClub analysis, recommendations, forecasts and hypothetical scenarios.

Sources