A vessel count is not a forecast berth or transit time
A charterer preparing a voyage estimate in November 2026 faced a basic problem: the Strait of Hormuz backlog was visible, but the waiting time for an individual ship was not reliably reducible to one market-wide number.
JMIC’s November 12 update estimated approximately 211 commercial vessels stationary at the main anchorages east of the strait around Fujairah, Khor Fakkan, Sohar, and Musandam. It contrasted that total with single-digit to low double-digit AIS-visible transits per day and expected the backlog to persist. The same report cautioned that its congestion figures were internal AIS estimates and excluded vessels not visible on AIS.
Those qualifications matter. Dividing 211 ships by a daily transit count might produce an attractive spreadsheet answer, but it would assume a single first-in, first-out queue. Actual movement can depend on direction, vessel type, cargo, draft, security coordination, route, coastal-state instructions, naval facilitation, weather, machinery readiness, and commercial choice. Some stationary vessels may be waiting for cargo, orders, bunkers, repairs, insurance approval, or a berth rather than a Hormuz transit.
A responsible estimate therefore presents a range tied to explicit conditions. It does not describe an unverified queue position as a booked slot.
Separate the sources of delay
The first step is to decompose waiting time. Security delay arises when the owner, master, insurer, flag, or authorities do not consider movement acceptable. Traffic-management delay arises from sequencing, route capacity, or coordination. Port delay concerns berth availability and terminal operations. Commercial delay can follow missing orders, documents, cargo readiness, or counterpart approvals. Technical delay includes defects, surveys, stores, or crew matters.
These categories can overlap, but they have different contractual and financial consequences. A ship drifting while awaiting security clearance is not necessarily in the same position as a ship anchored under port instructions. A vessel that chooses not to proceed may be treated differently from one prohibited from proceeding. The applicable charter party, port rules, notices, and facts determine whether time counts and who bears related costs.
The IMO’s June evacuation-plan FAQs illustrate why a simple queue model can fail. During that specific plan, vessels were told not to move until contacted, and the waiting area was not to be approached without instruction because crowding could force notifications to pause. Movement depended on coordinated sequencing and route discussions with coastal authorities. That mechanism was active from June 23 to 26 and should not be assumed to govern November traffic. It nevertheless shows that safe capacity can be determined by coordination and risk, not by the physical width of the waterway alone.
JMIC’s November data also used different traffic sources for US-facilitated and non-facilitated movements, each with its own scope. Analysts should not combine unlike counts without preserving the definitions.
Build three voyage cases, not one false precision
A commercially useful estimate can use base, adverse, and severe cases. The base case should reflect the best verified current evidence and assume that all vessel-specific approvals arrive as expected. The adverse case should add a defined delay for congestion or a temporary suspension. The severe case can model a material incident, loss of routing availability, or a decision not to transit.
Each case should state its information cutoff and assumptions. Variables may include days waiting, daily hire or time-charter equivalent, bunkers consumed at anchor or while drifting, port and agency expenses, war-risk additional premium, security services, crew support, cargo financing, storage, documentary costs, and downstream delivery exposure. Any rate not evidenced by a real quotation should be labeled as a hypothetical input.
Probability-weighting can help compare choices, but it should not imply scientific certainty. If a charterer assigns a 50 percent chance to a ten-day delay, that probability is a commercial judgment, not an observed fact unless supported by a defined dataset. The estimate should preserve both the unweighted scenarios and the reasoning behind any weights.
The model also needs decision dates. A voyage that is attractive with a five-day wait may become uneconomic after fifteen days. Principals can agree review points at fixture, before entering the area, on arrival at a holding location, after a material security warning, and when an insurance quotation expires. That turns an uncertain forecast into a governed process.
Connect the estimate to contract wording
Waiting-time economics cannot be separated from the charter. Parties should examine the laycan, cancelling provisions, notices of readiness, laytime and demurrage language, off-hire terms, safe-port warranty, war-risk clauses, employment orders, liberties, deviation rights, and allocation of additional insurance costs.
For a voyage charter, the location and validity of a notice of readiness can be decisive. For a time charter, the issue may be whether the ship remains on hire and whether an order exposes it to contractually unacceptable danger. Cargo-sale obligations, letters of credit, terminal windows, and sanctions clauses may introduce separate deadlines.
No general article can determine those outcomes without the contract and facts. The operational contribution is to keep the delay categories, timestamps, and instructions clear. The commercial team should preserve messages showing why the vessel waited, who issued an instruction, what alternatives were assessed, and when the position changed.
Brokers should also avoid turning anecdotal waits into a market rule. A report that one tanker moved after two days says little about a differently flagged LNG carrier awaiting separate approvals. Comparable evidence needs comparable vessel characteristics, route, period, and coordination status.
Reduce exposure while preserving optionality
Waiting is not risk-free. JMIC has warned that congestion can create restricted maneuvering space, anchor-dragging exposure, collision risk, and predictable vessel concentrations. Security assessments have also emphasized that stationary or patterned operations may increase vulnerability. The master and company must determine the safest lawful waiting arrangement, maintain bridge and machinery readiness, and monitor official advice.
Commercially, optionality may come from delaying commitment before the ship reaches the highest-risk area, selecting cargo windows with realistic buffers, arranging conditional alternatives, or sourcing outside the Gulf where the economics support it. None of these choices is free. The correct comparison includes the cost of keeping a ship available, losing a cargo, replacing supply, or accepting a longer route.
UN Trade and Development warned in September that chokepoint disruption cascades into congestion, schedule unreliability, and further delays. That observation supports planning for linked effects rather than treating Hormuz as an isolated transit line. A delayed Gulf cargo can miss a receiving-terminal window, disrupt inventory, and alter the next employment of the vessel.
Zeaclub’s direction in agentic maritime workflows can be applied here with appropriate limits. A workflow can capture current advisory timestamps, maintain scenario assumptions, flag incompatible traffic datasets, and recalculate exposure when the waiting estimate changes. It should never manufacture a queue position or security clearance. The commercial advantage comes from updating a transparent decision model faster than a static spreadsheet, while accountable humans retain control of the voyage and fixture.
This article distinguishes verified source material from ZeaClub analysis, recommendations, forecasts and hypothetical scenarios.
Sources
- JMIC Advisory Update 113, November 12, 2026Accessed 2026-11-18
- IMO operational FAQs for the June Hormuz evacuation planAccessed 2026-11-18
- UNCTAD statement on chokepoint disruption and maritime congestionAccessed 2026-11-18
- JMIC advisory on congestion and secondary navigation risks, March 1, 2026Accessed 2026-11-18