Confirm which routes are operational now

Historical routing notices must not be treated as current permission. A June JMIC advisory described the southern route in Omani territorial waters as clear of mines at that time and recommended it while clearance continued. The November threat picture is materially different.

The operator should obtain current route status, coordinates, direction, reporting, vessel restrictions, validity and coordinating coastal authority. An informal statement that "ships are using the north" or "the south is open" is incomplete.

IMO's evacuation framework in June allowed vessels to choose a northern route coordinated with Iran or a southern route coordinated with Oman after notification. IMO provided an overall framework, while the coastal States handled operational routing and traffic deconfliction. That arrangement was specific to the activated evacuation mechanism and its dates.

The ordinary IMO-adopted traffic separation scheme remains the internationally recognised routeing framework. Temporary routes can be used under current official instructions when safety conditions require them, but the bridge should understand whether it is following a temporary corridor, an existing lane or another authorised measure.

The company should verify that its flag, insurer and security adviser recognise the proposed route and that no newer notice supersedes it.

Compare navigation rather than just distance

The shorter geometric track is not necessarily the safer or faster passage. The bridge should compare charted depth, under-keel clearance, width, turns, cross-track limits, traffic, currents, visibility and available abort or holding areas.

A route close to shore may offer better radar and visual fixing when GNSS is unreliable. It may also have tighter water, more local traffic or coastal restrictions. A more offshore route may offer manoeuvring room but less terrestrial position support.

Mine information needs exact boundaries, source and time. "Cleared route" should identify the assessed corridor and conditions. Neither adjacent water nor an emergency turn is automatically included.

The ship's draft and manoeuvring data can make one option impracticable. A deep-draft tanker should not accept a route merely because a smaller vessel used it. The route check must include safety contour, squat, tide where relevant and turning margins.

Congestion can change the comparison. A longer route with controlled spacing may produce less delay and collision exposure than a shorter route where ships merge without sequence.

Each option should be plotted as a complete passage from the current holding position to safe water, not only through the narrowest section.

Compare the current security picture

The security comparison should use recent incidents, threat reporting, military activity, hailing patterns, inspections and the ship's profile. It should not rely on the absence of attacks during a short period.

JMIC's November reporting described attacks as highly likely, particularly off Musandam, and said AIS-on vessels could receive hails directing them toward the northern Iranian-controlled route. A directed hail is an operational event to authenticate and report, not proof that the northern route is safe or unsafe.

Cargo, ownership, management, flag, port history and destination can alter attention from different actors. Neutral status may permit transit while still leading to questions, visit and search, or monitoring.

Military standoff requirements can affect usable water. A route that is hydrographically suitable may become impractical if it places the ship too close to units or an active operation. The bridge needs current positions through authorised coordination rather than assuming warships remain fixed.

Attack, boarding, mine, collision and misidentification risks should be scored separately. A single red, amber or green label can hide that one route has greater navigation risk while the other has greater inspection or kinetic exposure.

Uncertainty must be explicit. If reliable current information is unavailable for one route, that is a decision factor rather than a reason to assume average risk.

Coordinate with the correct authority

The northern and southern choices can involve different coastal-state contacts, communications channels and traffic instructions. The ship should use the authenticated details in the current notice.

IMO's operational FAQs said vessels choosing the northern route coordinated with Iran and vessels choosing the southern route coordinated with Oman. It also said route changes were permissible only when operationally feasible and coordinated with the authorities concerned.

The bridge should not switch sides after hearing an unauthenticated hail or seeing other vessels alter. A cross-route move can intersect traffic, leave assessed water or enter a military area.

MARAD directs U.S.-flagged ships to coordinate closely with NAVCENT NCAGS and consider its recommendations. Other flags should use their own national guidance while complying with applicable coastal and navigational requirements.

The master needs a clear conflict-resolution path when authority messages differ. Shore security staff can authenticate and escalate; the bridge preserves safe course and speed while the issue is resolved, if possible.

All route approvals should have an expiry trigger. A new incident, mine warning, closure, communications loss, missed slot or changed ship condition requires revalidation.

Price the commercial consequences honestly

The route comparison should include distance, speed constraints, queue, inspection time, fuel, destination arrival, return-passage options and insurance conditions. A northern route that appears shorter can take longer if verification or visit-and-search delays are expected. A southern route can face congestion or incident-related suspension.

Owners should provide charterers with scenarios, not a guaranteed crossing time. Brokers can report route requested, authority confirmation pending, route approved and route completed as separate states.

War-risk underwriters may price or condition routes differently. The owner should disclose the intended route and material changes through agreed secure channels. Insurance approval does not transfer navigational responsibility.

Sanctions and compliance teams should review any payments, services, port contacts or instructions associated with the route. The fact that a coastal authority coordinates navigation does not resolve every trade or sanctions issue.

Contracts determine liability for delay, deviation and additional cost. The operational team should preserve the reasons for route choice without writing a legal conclusion for a later dispute.

Use a decision matrix without automating the answer

A practical matrix can compare current authority, navigational fit, mine evidence, recent incidents, military proximity, inspections, communications, emergency support, insurance and commercial timing for both routes.

Each entry should link to a source and verification time. A route should not win because unknown values are scored as neutral. Unknowns need their own penalty or a requirement for clarification.

The final decision belongs to the master and company under flag, safety-management and security procedures. The May industry guidance expressly says route selection is a company and master decision based on current intelligence, flag guidance and voyage-specific assessment, with UKMTO and JMIC coordination.

A Zeaclub route-comparison board can show the two options side by side, expire evidence and record approvals. Sensitive coordinates and live timings should remain role-restricted. It should never label one route "the safe route."

After transit, actual delay, hails, traffic, navigation performance and incidents can be recorded as experience, clearly separated from authority information. One successful passage updates evidence but does not guarantee the next.

Choosing north or south is not a political preference or a shortcut calculation. It is a fresh operational decision that combines coastal coordination, international routeing, ship capability, current threat evidence and commercial consequences. In November 2026, neither side of Hormuz deserves a permanent green light.

This article distinguishes verified source material from ZeaClub analysis, recommendations, forecasts and hypothetical scenarios.

Sources