The recovery depends on an extra link
Gulf of Oman ship-to-ship transfer, or STS, has become part of the region's emergency export architecture. A tanker can move a cargo through the Strait of Hormuz or from a constrained loading area, then transfer it to another vessel positioned for the long-haul voyage. The arrangement can separate short, higher-risk movements from the ocean leg and let exporters match available ships to changing operational conditions.
That flexibility is valuable, but it is not free capacity. Two ships, transfer equipment, service craft, qualified personnel, a suitable location, and a workable weather window must converge. The cargo remains in motion commercially while it may be stationary physically. For shipowners, charterers, brokers, insurers, and traders, STS therefore changes the meaning of export recovery: more barrels can leave the Gulf while every barrel consumes more vessel time and operational attention than it did under a direct voyage.
What the verified flow data show
The International Energy Agency reported that robust Gulf of Oman STS activity helped total oil flows through Hormuz rise by 3.7 million barrels per day to 10.9 million barrels per day in September 2026. Gulf crude exports reached 13.9 million barrels per day, more than 75 percent of their pre-war level, while bypass exports rose to 5.6 million barrels per day.
These are verified estimates, not proof that the transport system had normalized. The IEA separately said congestion, rerouting, and growing STS use lengthened delivery times and reduced fleet efficiency. Its chokepoint monitor also warns that AIS-based estimates carry high uncertainty because some tankers operate with transponders off and regional jamming and spoofing distort observation. Commercial teams should use the flow figures as a directional measure, not as a complete voyage census.
The MARPOL compliance floor
STS is a regulated oil-cargo operation, not an improvised hose connection. MARPOL Annex I Chapter 8 applies to oil tankers of 150 gross tonnage and above engaged in transferring oil cargo at sea, subject to stated exclusions. Regulation 41 requires an Administration-approved STS operations plan. Regulation 42 establishes advance notification requirements to the relevant coastal State for operations in its territorial sea or exclusive economic zone.
The IMO text excludes bunkering and certain platform-related transfers from this particular chapter, among other specified cases. Those distinctions matter when contracts and approvals describe an operation. A commercial team should verify the actual cargo movement, location, vessels, flag requirements, coastal-State rules, and approved plans rather than assuming that every offshore transfer follows one identical process.
One cargo can consume two ship schedules
A direct voyage occupies one carrying hull from load port to discharge. An STS chain can require a shuttle or feeder tanker, a receiving tanker, and waiting time on both sides. If either vessel arrives late, the other may lose productive days. Fendering, mooring, cargo transfer, sampling, documentation, separation, and post-operation clearance all add time even when execution is smooth.
This is why rising export volumes need not release freight pressure. The relevant denominator is not simply the number of ships afloat. It is the number of ship-days available for revenue cargoes after positioning, waiting, transfer, security restrictions, and delay. A modest increase in time per voyage, multiplied across repeated movements, can absorb substantial effective capacity.
Shuttle and long-haul markets separate
STS creates linked but distinct demand. One segment needs vessels willing and suitable to perform the regional leg. Another needs tonnage for the long-haul destination. The ships may differ in size, approvals, ownership profile, insurance appetite, and charter duration. Freight can therefore strengthen in one segment while appearing less extreme in another.
Static time raises the security burden
STS requires predictable proximity and reduced maneuvering freedom. JMIC warned in March that vessels anchored, drifting, alongside, or otherwise operating predictably faced elevated exposure amid missiles, uncrewed aerial vehicles, stand-off weapons, and collateral effects. It also identified GNSS interference, AIS anomalies, spoofing, and communications disruption as risk amplifiers around congested anchorages and approaches.
That advisory describes the threat environment, not a finding that every STS area or operation will be attacked. Still, the operational inference is direct: two ships connected or preparing to connect cannot respond like a vessel at sea speed. Security assessment must cover approach, waiting, transfer, separation, and post-transfer routing, not merely the passage through Hormuz.
Pollution exposure crosses several balance sheets
An STS incident can involve cargo loss, hull damage, cleanup, coastal-State action, third-party claims, and schedule disruption. Responsibility may engage both ships, their owners, technical managers, STS service providers, charterers, cargo interests, and insurers. The existence of an approved plan does not eliminate the need to test emergency contacts, spill response arrangements, equipment compatibility, and evidence preservation.
Owners should confirm that counterpart vessels and service providers meet internal and insurer requirements. Charterers should verify that contractual indemnities align with insurance rather than relying on broad language that may not respond as expected. Traders should understand that a small operational incident can impair the marketability and timing of an otherwise sound cargo.
Quantity and quality need a custody trail
Every custody transfer introduces measurement questions. Figures may differ because of temperature, calibration, line content, remaining-on-board quantities, sampling method, or normal measurement uncertainty. When prices are volatile, a small unexplained difference can become a large dispute.
Documentation must follow the physical chain
Compliance teams should screen both vessels and relevant counterparties, including ownership and control, and document why the transfer structure is commercially and operationally necessary. STS is not inherently suspicious. Yet opaque vessel histories, unexplained AIS gaps, altered documents, or inconsistent origin claims require escalation rather than commercial optimism.
Laytime clauses face new facts
Traditional voyage terms may not allocate an emergency STS chain cleanly. Disputes can arise over whether the transfer is part of the contracted voyage, whether notice of readiness is valid, whose orders caused waiting, and whether security or weather delay counts. The answer depends on the actual wording and facts, not on a universal market custom.
Before fixing, charterers and owners should specify the permitted operation, nominated area, approval conditions, time counting, cost allocation, deviation rights, and consequences if the operation cannot proceed. Brokers add value by recording assumptions in the recap instead of leaving them to later inference.
Insurance approval is an operational gate
An owner may be technically able to perform an STS but commercially unable to proceed until hull, P&I, war-risk, flag, class, and internal approvals align. A receiving vessel may also be unacceptable to a terminal or cargo counterparty. Approval time should be built into scheduling, with complete information supplied early.
A hypothetical illustrates the ship-day penalty
Consider a hypothetical cargo moved by a regional tanker to a Gulf of Oman rendezvous and transferred to a VLCC. The feeder waits two days for the receiver, weather interrupts preparation for one day, transfer and separation consume another day, and the VLCC then sails east. No casualty occurs and the cargo arrives.
The export is successful, but the chain has consumed several additional ship-days, exposed two schedules to the same delay, and generated extra service, insurance, and documentation costs. If repeated across many cargoes, this operational success can coexist with high freight and reduced fleet efficiency. This example is illustrative, not a report of an actual fixture.
What normalization would look like
Normalization is not simply a higher monthly export number. It would mean fewer emergency transfers, shorter and more predictable waiting, restored direct-voyage options, lower security friction, dependable navigation signals, broader insurer appetite, and a decline in the extra ship-days needed per delivered barrel.
The ZeaClub view
Gulf of Oman STS has become a bridge between constrained Gulf operations and the global tanker system. The bridge supports export recovery, yet it also transfers risk from the chokepoint into a multi-party offshore operation. Its price is measured in ship-days, approvals, waiting, service costs, security exposure, and documentation work.
Owners should price the whole risk window and preserve the master's stop-work authority. Charterers should compare full-chain delivered cost and write explicit time-allocation clauses. Brokers should map both tanker segments and their dependencies. Insurers should assess the precise vessels, place, procedures, and threat conditions. Traders should maintain an auditable custody and compliance record. The winning commercial strategy is not to treat STS as abnormal or routine. It is to treat it as a disciplined transport system whose capacity and risks must be measured cargo by cargo.
This article distinguishes verified source material from ZeaClub analysis, recommendations, forecasts and hypothetical scenarios.
Sources
- IEA, Oil Market Report, October 2026Accessed 2026-11-19
- IEA, The Soaring Cost of Shipping Is Lifting the Price of OilAccessed 2026-11-19
- IMO, Resolution MEPC.186(59), MARPOL Annex I Chapter 8Accessed 2026-11-19
- JMIC, Advisory Note Update 007, 7 March 2026Accessed 2026-11-19
- IEA, Middle East Maritime Chokepoints Shipping MonitorAccessed 2026-11-19