Decide whether the bridge is unsafe
Blast damage can create glazing fragments, structural debris, fire, smoke, toxic gas, live electrical equipment and unexploded ordnance. The bridge may also become untenable through heat or loss of visibility.
Assess remotely or from protected access where possible. Isolate electrical circuits if damaged and safe to do so. Control fire and smoke through the ship's plan without spreading them into escape routes or the alternate control location.
Do not send officers back for laptops, charts or photographs while immediate danger remains. Preserve people first. Navigation information can be reconstructed from backups and authorities.
Account for everyone who was on the bridge, including pilot, lookout or riding personnel. Treat blast, hearing and smoke injuries promptly.
Set an exclusion boundary and conditions for re-entry. “Smoke clearing” is not the same as structural or explosive safety.
Name one alternate conning location
The master should state where command is moving and who holds each role. Possible locations depend on the ship: bridge wing, emergency steering position, engine control room, cargo control room or another protected space with communications and usable information.
An alternate location must support or receive:
- heading and position; - traffic and lookout reports; - rudder and propulsion orders; - actual response confirmation; - distress and safety communications; - navigation-light and signal status; and - damage and security information.
No single space may provide everything. The ship can operate as a distributed team, but only with one command chain and closed-loop communications.
Announce the transfer to all emergency stations. Keep a written order and event log. If the master becomes incapacitated, the succession specified by the safety-management system should be activated clearly.
A shoreside emergency room cannot become the conning position.
Rebuild steering and engine control
Determine whether bridge controls, local controls, hydraulic power and feedback remain functional. A rudder-angle display at the alternate location may not be independent or may have lost its sensor.
If emergency steering is used, establish dedicated communication between command and the steering-gear compartment. IMO survey requirements reflect SOLAS provisions for communication, heading relay and visual compass information to emergency steering positions.
Use standard, repeated orders:
1. command states rudder or heading; 2. receiving station repeats it; 3. station executes; 4. actual rudder or ship response is reported; and 5. command confirms or corrects.
Do the same for engine orders. Account for delay. A manual relay through several people is slower than bridge control.
Test with small movements where traffic and sea room permit. Define the reliable operating envelope. If the ship cannot manoeuvre as required, assess and signal not-under-command status under COLREG.
Establish a trusted heading and position
A damaged integrated bridge may lose several displays through one common failure. IMO's integrated-bridge requirements call for subsystem failures to be alarmed and not cause failure of other subsystems, but blast can damage common power, networks or sensors.
Inventory what remains:
- magnetic compass and repeaters; - gyro or independent heading source; - radar and antennas; - GNSS receivers; - electronic and paper charts; - echo sounder; - speed and log; - AIS; - visual bearings; and - external traffic information.
Cross-check sources. Regional satellite-navigation interference can produce plausible false positions. Radar ranges, visual bearings, depth and dead reckoning may provide stronger confirmation.
State the fix method and confidence in every report. Do not copy a coordinate from a damaged display without verification.
If radar remains only at the unusable bridge, weigh the danger of brief protected access against the value and alternatives. Do not normalize repeated exposure.
Create a protected lookout network
SOLAS bridge-visibility standards assume a navigational bridge and defined fields of view. An alternate internal station may have little or no view.
Post lookouts at safe positions with overlapping sectors. Give each a sector, reporting format and communications. Protect them from fragments, smoke, heat and hostile observation as far as possible.
Report bearing, range trend, aspect and time, not “ship close on starboard.” Maintain a traffic plot centrally. If communications fail, use pre-agreed signals or withdraw lookouts from exposed positions.
Thermal cameras and CCTV can help but may have blind spots, delay or damage. They supplement rather than prove the traffic picture.
A person on an open bridge wing should not remain exposed merely to satisfy a routine station assignment. Risk changes by the minute.
Ask nearby ships and VTS for traffic assistance, but keep the ship's own lookout to the extent possible.
Keep distress and safety communications operating
Move a portable VHF and backup communications to the command location. Establish contact with UKMTO, the appropriate VTS or coastal authority, and the company through distinct reporting channels.
Tell traffic:
- identity and verified position; - bridge casualty; - propulsion and steering capability; - course, speed and drift; - lights or signals unavailable; - assistance required; and - next update.
If VHF antennas or cabling are damaged, a powered set may have limited range. Test with a known station and use portable or alternate antennas under approved arrangements.
Protect GMDSS reserve energy. Maintain listening watch and a manual communication log.
The ship security alert system does not replace a distress or navigation warning. Use each system for its intended purpose.
Re-enter and restore in stages
Do not rush back because smoke appears thinner. A competent team should assess atmosphere, structure, glazing, electrical condition, fire, ordnance and access.
When re-entry is authorized, retrieve or restore the most critical functions first. Preserve VDR and electronic evidence before rebooting or replacing equipment where safety allows.
Test each system and identify its source and limitations. A radar screen coming on does not prove antenna, heading and position inputs are correct. Verify sensor associations.
Keep the alternate command system active until the bridge has demonstrated stable navigation, steering, engine communication, power and visibility. Define who formally transfers control back and announce the time.
Temporary window covering, portable equipment or local repairs may support movement to refuge, but class, flag and coastal authorities may impose conditions. Normal voyage fitness requires more than a habitable room.
Preserve evidence and commercial clarity
Record the bridge condition, evacuation time, casualties, control transfer, system availability, fixes, orders, traffic warnings, re-entry and restoration tests.
Save VDR data, radar recordings, alarms, CCTV and communications. Photograph damage from safe positions. Do not move suspected ordnance or fragments for evidence.
Commercial notices should state the operational effect: “conning transferred to emergency station with local steering” is more useful than “bridge damaged.” Give verified capability, restrictions and next decision point.
Charterers should not press the ship to maintain schedule through a degraded command system. Insurers and class need the technical chronology. Authorities need honest manoeuvring and communication limits.
Attribution of the strike remains separate from navigation facts.
A controlled scenario
A tanker in outbound Hormuz traffic suffers blast damage to bridge windows and loses integrated displays. Smoke makes the wheelhouse untenable, but machinery and local steering remain available.
The master transfers command to a protected station, establishes direct voice communication with steering and engine control, and posts protected lookouts. One radar repeater and magnetic compass support navigation, while radar ranges verify position against suspected GNSS interference. Traffic and VTS receive the ship's limitations. Control returns only after the bridge is inspected and systems tested.
This is a hypothetical training scenario, not a report of a specific casualty or forecast.
Commercial conclusion
An unusable bridge is a command-system casualty. The answer is disciplined distribution of functions, not heroic exposure or optimistic electronics.
Owners should define alternate conning arrangements and drill control transfer. Masters need authority to reduce speed, declare status, anchor or seek tow. VTS and nearby ships need precise capability reports. Charterers and insurers need a tested restoration threshold.
ZeaClub can track command location, system status, fixes, warnings and approvals. It cannot con the ship, determine COLREG status or certify the bridge fit for service.
This article distinguishes verified source material from ZeaClub analysis, recommendations, forecasts and hypothetical scenarios.
Sources
- IMO Resolution MSC.99(73), SOLAS navigation bridge visibility requirementsAccessed 2026-11-19
- International Maritime Organization, Integrated Bridge SystemsAccessed 2026-11-19
- IMO Resolution A.1207(34), Survey Guidelines under the Harmonized System of Survey and CertificationAccessed 2026-11-19
- International Maritime Organization, SOLAS Convention overviewAccessed 2026-11-19
- International Maritime Organization, RadiocommunicationsAccessed 2026-11-19
- International Maritime Organization, Safety of navigationAccessed 2026-11-19