BMP supports water-based defenses
IMO’s circulated Best Management Practices for Maritime Security describes fire hoses, remotely operated water cannons, spray rails and fire monitors as options. It says water spray and monitors can deter or delay illegal boarding and recommends fixed positioning to cover likely access routes.
The guidance also notes practical limits. Pumps require power, wind and sea conditions affect coverage, and systems must be drilled and secured before harbour operations.
This is important language: deter or delay, not guarantee. A craft carrying firearms, an explosive device or determined boarders may continue through spray.
Water should buy time for manoeuvring, alarms, reporting and movement to protected locations. It should not encourage crew to remain at the rail watching the result.
Early detection is the real first barrier
A hose becomes useful only after the ship knows where the approach is occurring. Lookouts, radar, cameras, lighting and bridge-team monitoring should detect unusual small craft before they reach the hull.
The watch should report bearing, range, speed, number of persons, ladders, weapons, communications and behavior. A fishing boat crossing the track is not automatically hostile.
Warning indicators can include repeated closing after course changes, pacing the ship, concealed identity, ladders or hooks, weapons, attempts to reach a low access point, or placing objects on the hull.
UKMTO’s after-action form records craft, suspect numbers, ladders, weapons, freeboard and defensive measures. That structure helps crews observe behavior without claiming nationality or motive they cannot establish.
Speed and manoeuvring may matter more
The May 2026 Hormuz guidance states that maintaining full speed and using evasive manoeuvring, where safe, can reduce vulnerability to a water-borne improvised explosive device or uncrewed surface vessel. It also recommends avoiding speed reductions where possible because remaining underway makes targeting and boarding harder.
The master must still comply with collision regulations, traffic separation, depth, machinery limits and surrounding military instructions. An aggressive turn in the Strait can create a collision larger than the original threat.
A manoeuvre should be planned around the ship’s handling characteristics and the craft’s relative position. Large tankers cannot “out-turn” every small boat, and high speed increases stopping distance.
The bridge must keep propulsion, steering and navigation risks in the same decision, not hand control to a security team.
Keep crew away from exposed hoses
Hand-held firefighting nozzles can place seafarers directly above an approaching craft. Fixed, secured and remotely operated systems reduce that exposure.
BMP advises that hoses should be firmly secured. An unsecured charged hose can whip, injure personnel and fail to cover the access point. Pressure, drainage, deck icing in other climates, visibility and communications require assessment.
Crew should prepare systems before entering the exposure area where the risk assessment supports it. Rigging after a craft is close may be more dangerous than leaving the station unmanned.
The master should define when deck personnel withdraw. No commercial asset justifies keeping an unprotected seafarer at the rail within weapon or blast range.
Protect firefighting capability
Water defenses may draw on fire and general-service pumps. A ship then struck by a projectile or explosive device may immediately need those same systems for casualty control.
The chief engineer and bridge should know which pumps are running, power demand, pressure, redundancy and the effect of damage. Do not disable fixed fire arrangements or empty a critical reserve merely to maximize spray.
A remote shutdown, blackout or damaged main can remove coverage instantly. Physical barriers and access control should not depend on one powered system.
Ballast overflow, mentioned in BMP as another access deterrent, requires particular care to avoid excessive tank pressure and stability or pollution problems. It should never be improvised outside approved procedures.
Do not invent offensive devices
BMP discusses propeller arresters and physical obstacles as possible measures, but any equipment must be evaluated for its impact on the ship, crew, environment and lawful port operations.
Improvised cables, projectiles, chemicals, electrical devices or thrown objects can injure innocent seafarers, foul the ship’s own propulsion, breach coastal-State law or escalate an ambiguous encounter.
The use of force and armed guards depends on flag and coastal-State rules, contracts and approved procedures. A water monitor is a defensive tool, not permission to target every boat that approaches.
Warning signs, lighting, VHF calls and sound signals may help establish intent, but they must not distract from manoeuvring and reporting.
Know when boarding prevention has failed
If people gain access, crew should not conduct an untrained deck confrontation. The alarm, muster and secure-area procedures in the ship security plan become central.
The master may activate SSAS and required distress or security reporting. The CSO and authorities need position, craft description, persons seen, access point and whether weapons or devices were observed.
Citadel or secure-area use depends on the threat and plan. It must not trap crew near fire, flooding or a device attached to the hull.
Engine control, bridge access, communications and crew accountability should be protected in advance. Physical barriers that obstruct emergency escape are unacceptable.
Recent attacks show the stakes
UKMTO Warning 187-26 reported a small boat attaching two explosive devices above a tanker’s waterline in the Strait of Hormuz. The blasts caused an engine-room fire and temporary disablement.
That event does not establish that water spray would have prevented the approach. It shows why access to the ship’s side can have consequences beyond boarding.
Scenario, not a forecast: Spray may cause an opportunistic skiff to break off. The same measure may have little effect on a remote-controlled explosive boat. The bridge must assess observed behavior and retain an escape or casualty plan.
Build and test a layered package
Before transit, the master, SSO and CSO should verify:
- lookout sectors and protected positions; - radar and camera coverage; - safe speed and manoeuvre options; - fixed hose or monitor coverage; - pump and power redundancy; - physical barriers and emergency escape; - alarm, SSAS and reporting procedures; - withdrawal criteria for deck teams; and - post-impact fire and damage control.
Drills should simulate an approach from different quarters and equipment failure. They should measure detection, bridge notification, pump start, coverage, crew withdrawal and reporting.
A successful drill is not one that soaks the mock attacker. It is one that keeps the ship navigationally safe and crew out of exposed positions.
ZeaClub can manage the equipment-readiness matrix, drill record, threat observations, reporting and corrective actions. It cannot direct manoeuvres or authorize force.
Commercial conclusion
Water spray is a useful delaying layer against some small-craft boarding attempts. It is not a universal answer to the Gulf’s mix of harassment, firearms, attached explosives and uncrewed attack craft.
Owners should invest in fixed coverage, protected operation and pump redundancy, then integrate them with detection, speed, manoeuvring and secure-area plans. The measure succeeds when it creates decision time without exposing crew or sacrificing the systems needed after an impact.
This article distinguishes verified source material from ZeaClub analysis, recommendations, forecasts and hypothetical scenarios.
Sources
- IMO MSC.1/Circ.1601/Rev.2, Best Management Practices Maritime SecurityAccessed 2026-11-19
- UKMTO, Best Management PracticesAccessed 2026-11-19
- Industry Guidance on the Safe Management of Vessel Transit through the Strait of Hormuz, May 2026Accessed 2026-11-19
- UKMTO Warning 187-26 Update 001, 29 October 2026Accessed 2026-11-19
- UKMTO After Action Report formatAccessed 2026-11-19
- International Maritime Organization, Piracy and armed robbery against shipsAccessed 2026-11-19